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Flagging the Middle Ground of the
Right to Be Forgotten: Combatting
Old News with Search Engine Flags
By Hannah L. Cook*
ABSTRACT
Incomplete and outdated news articles present an increasing
problem for individuals who find themselves stigmatized on the basis
of truthful but misleading reports. This Article proposes a moderate
solution between the European right to be forgotten and the
protectionless tatus quo in the United States. It proposes a flagging
system, administered through Federal Trade Commission
adjudications, where links to articles whose private harms outweigh
their public benefits are flagged in the search results of an individual.
This flag will help combat psychological biases that may cause decision
makers to place an irrational weight on these articles while preserving
the ability of the public to access the information.
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I. THE PROBLEM: MISLEADING INFORMATION WRECKS LIVES
Sometimes, a person's life takes a disastrous, unanticipated
turn. Imagine sitting at the breakfast table, reading the newspaper,
when suddenly the police appear at your house to arrest you for a
crime you never committed. The crime could be major or
minor-anything from drug distribution to murder to overdue
speeding tickets. In the day or two it takes to sort out the
problem-perhaps the drugs are your child's, the actual murder
suspect shares your name, or you recently sold your car-the local
newspapers have already published truthful information about your
arrest and the crime of which you were suspected. The newspapers
have no legal obligation to update their reporting or to allow you to set
the record straight.'
Not long ago, that stressful arrest would have been the end of
the story. The incident would have been relegated to the memories of
local gossips; you would have moved on and faced no lasting
consequences from such a horrific mistake. But today, any person can
simply put your name in an Internet search engine, read the
uncorrected news from that fateful day, and make decisions affecting
your life based on it. An arrest and the subsequent news stories may
remain an obstacle to obtaining jobs, housing, loans, and more for
many years.
1. See, e.g., Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 553 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding no
newspaper liability for reporting arrest); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243,
258 (1974) (striking down a state statute's guarantee of a candidate's right to have space in a
newspaper to respond to criticism as a violation of the First Amendment).
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Such ordeals affect thousands of people. Empirical studies
show the rate of false convictions for felonies is 3-5 percent.2 One
study found a full third of people arrested in the District of Columbia
in 2009 were never charged with a crime, and of those charged almost
half were not convicted.3 Every false arrest, charge, or conviction
creates a record (and sometimes many records) that can continue to
haunt the victim indefinitely.
Now add to this mix the fact that there are more and more
pieces of data available to help search engines connect subjects' past
and present lives. At a New York arts festival, almost four hundred
people gave away pieces of identifying information-such as their
home addresses, fingerprints, or the last four digits of their Social
Security numbers-in exchange for a cookie.4 The printed terms of
use, which were signed by all but twenty of the people who took a
form, gave the collector "the right to do almost anything she wanted
with the information."5 In 2013, Google was indexing over thirty
trillion unique webpages (in 2008, that number was just one trillion)
for over one hundred billion searches a month.6 Each of these data
points, be it a Facebook account, a registration for a discount deal
service, or a newspaper article about a long-forgotten arrest, is being
indexed by Google and being used to create a powerful dossier that
puts the juiciest information (that most likely to be clicked and linked
to) at the top.7
The long-term impacts of this digital accumulation are unclear.
Perhaps individuals should not worry about the plethora of content
being posted, cached, and indexed. Studies have suggested only 10-15
2. D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 780 (2007).
3. P. MITCHELL DOWNEY, JOHN ROMAN & AKIVA LIBERMAN, URBAN INST., ADULT
CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASE PROCESSING IN WASHINGTON, DC 6 (2012),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412562-Adult-Criminal-Justice-
Case-Processing-in-Washington-DC.pdf [https://perma.cc/XC6K-PEES].




6. See John Koetsier, How Google Searches 30 Trillion Web Pages, 100 Billion Times a
Month, VENTURE BEAT (Mar. 1, 2013, 12:43 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2013/03/01/how-google-
searches-30-trillion-web-pages- 100-billion-times-a-month/ [https://perma.cc/89A9-NULH].
7. Id.; see also DAVID R. BELL, LOCATION IS (STILL) EVERYTHING: THE SURPRISING
INFLUENCE OF THE REAL WORLD ON How WE SEARCH, SHOP, AND SELL IN THE VIRTUAL ONE 157
(2014) ("[T]he first link is typically the one most likely to be clicked on, the second the second
most likely, and so on.").
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percent of content posted online is still live a year later.8 On the other
hand, entire industries have sprung up to help job applicants clean up
their Google results9 and improve their online reputation scores
(scores generated by private companies that rank applicants based on
their social media profiles and Google search results).1 0 According to a
2009 survey, almost 80 percent of employers use search engines to
learn about job applicants, and most of those (almost 70 percent) will
reject applicants based on what they find." More than half of
employers reported they would reject a candidate based on "concerns
about the candidate's lifestyle," "inappropriate comments and text
written by the candidate," or "unsuitable photos, videos, and
information."12 Notice only one of these reasons necessarily involves
information posted by the job applicant.
Negative or misleading search results can be devastating to an
individual. One Spanish citizen noted "according to Google, I'm still in
debt and married," because of two articles that had been published
over a decade before in a local newspaper.13 A cottage industry of
mugshot extortion-websites prominently posting mugshots
(regardless of whether the person was ever convicted) in Google search
results unless paid to take them down-has exploded so much that a
bill was proposed in Alabama to ban the practice.14 A woman changed
her name after her Google search results became dominated by links
to nude photos and videos posted by an ex-boyfriend.15 The US Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that a woman who had
been arrested on drug charges could not have news articles about her
arrest taken down, even though the charges were dropped and under a
Connecticut "eraser" law the arrest was "deemed" to have never
8. See Meg Leta Ambrose, It's About Time: Privacy, Information Life Cycles, and the
Right To Be Forgotten, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 369, 372 (2013).
9. See Megan Angelo, You Are What Google Says You Are, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2009, 11:43
AM), https://www.wired.com/2009/02/you-are-what-go/ [https://perma.cclY64G-9W3Y]; see also
FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY
AND INFORMATION 55 (2015).
10. See PASQUALE, supra note 9, at 32.
11. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 8 (2014).
12. Id. at 9.
13. Cooper Mitchell-Rekrut, Note, Search Engine Liability Under the LIBE Data
Regulation Proposal: Interpreting Third Party Responsibilities as Informed by Google Spain, 45
GEO. J. INT'L L. 861, 866 (2014).
14. See H.B. 8, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2015 (Ala. 2015); see also Jim Stinson, Charging
People to Remove Their Mugshots from Websites Could Be Illegal Soon, ALABAMACOM (Jan. 23,
2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/01/charging people-to remove thei.html
[https://perma.cc/6BT4-MMXX].
15. See CITRON, supra note 11, at 48.
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happened.1 6 She will likely have difficulty getting a job or being
approved for a loan for years to come.1 7
Today, individuals have little recourse against the search
engine results that make them unemployable, undateable, and
unsuitable for loans, especially if the information was true when it
was published. The European Union has provided individuals with a
right to be forgotten, which cuts the lifespan of this problem by
allowing search results to be removed when the information becomes
more harmful to the individual than helpful to the public.1 8 The
United States, however, has rejected such a right based on practical
and First Amendment difficulties.1 9
This Article proposes an alternative: amending Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act (CDA) 20 to force search engines to
display a flag on search results the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
has found to be misleading and that have caused plaintiffs harm
which outweighs the information's benefit-even though the results
contain truthful reporting. This alternative strikes a balance between
the free speech interests of journalists and publishers, the privacy
interests of plaintiffs, and the pragmatic concerns of search engines.
It also reflects that information has changing benefits and costs over
time: information about a recent arrest may be highly valuable, while
information about an arrest that led to no charges twenty years ago
may not provide much value at all.2 1
Part II of this Article discusses the right to be
forgotten-Europe's answer to the problem of truthful but misleading
information-and why the United States has rejected this approach.
Part III proposes a system of flags, administered by the FTC, in which
16. Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 548, 553 (2d Cir. 2015).
17. A similar issue is presented by expunged records. Job seekers do not have to report
expunged criminal records, but employers may still be able to dig them up in news reports found
through user search engines. See Meg Leta Ambrose, Nicole Friess & Jill Van Matre, Seeking
Digital Redemption: The Future of Forgiveness in the Internet Age, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 99, 142 (2012).
18. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espahiola de Protecci6n de Datos
(AEPD) 2014 E.C.R. 317.
19. See Michael J. Kelly & David Satola, The Right to Be Forgotten, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV.
1, 40-41 (2017) (arguing that implementing the right to be forgotten in the United States "would
require overcoming some seemingly insurmountable hurdles erected by over two hundred years
of First Amendment jurisprudence").
20. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56
137-39 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012)).
21. This approach is also consonant with some of the earliest literature on what would
become the right to be forgotten, which suggested color-coding information by years or requiring
it be sorted chronologically. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF
FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 124-25 (2009).
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small indicators are placed next to links in specific searches if the
information harms the individual more than it benefits the public.
This flagging system combats the psychological biases that may cause
a reader to overvalue the misleading information. Part III also
resolves the tension between First Amendment publisher protections
and the CDA's conduit immunities.
II. CURRENT SOLUTIONS: THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN AND ITS US
FAILURE
Europe has addressed the dilemma of truthful information that
is more harmful to the individual than helpful to society by
implementing a "right to be forgotten," while the current US scheme
offers little protection to individuals. The right to be forgotten,
sometimes called the "right to erasure,"22 is often discussed and rarely
defined. One author has offered three alternative definitions: (1) "the
right to delete the information one posts online;" (2) the right to delete
information about oneself that one originally posted, wherever it now
appears online; and (3) the right to eliminate any online information
about oneself, regardless of who originally posted it.23 The European
Union has passed a regulation that would provide its citizens with the
third, while most US citizens are offered the first by social networking
websites.24 Section A of this Part details the European Union's
approach to the right to be forgotten and Section B discusses the US
approach (or lack thereof), focusing especially on challenges posed by
the First Amendment to the right to be forgotten.
A. The Right to Be Forgotten in the European Union
Existing EU law already provides a right to be forgotten, and
an upcoming regulation will do even more. EU Directive 95/46
provides that "data-processing systems" must respect "fundamental
rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy" and contribute to
"the well-being of individuals."25 Data that does not comply with the
directive, especially "because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of
the data," can be erased or blocked.26
22. See Mitchell-Rekrut, supra note 13, at 875.
23. Ignacio Cofone, Google v. Spain: A Right to Be Forgotten?, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L &
CoM-P. L. 1, 2 (2015).
24. See id.
25. Council Directive 95/46, Recital 2, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC).
26. Id. art. 12(b).
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Directive 95/46 covers the "processing" and movement across
national borders of "personal data," which includes any information
that can be used to identify a person.2 7 This could be an identification
number, but the Directive also covers any factors that are sufficient to
identify a person, including her physical appearance or background.28
Processing and movement are also incredibly broad, covering "almost
any action that can be performed on electronically stored
information."29 In order to comply with the Directive, companies that
seek to process or transfer "personal data" must generally meet an
exception, such as having the consent of the identified individual.30
Other exceptions include processing that is necessary for a contract,
legal obligation, to protect the individual, or "for the purposes of the
legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or
parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests
are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of
the data subject."31 In practice, this means that data holders must
seek consent, document their data processing, respond to inquiries,
and allow people to opt-out of further processing.32
In 2012, the European Commission proposed a regulation that
would further strengthen the right to be forgotten.33 The regulation
passed the EU Parliament in April 2016 and will come into force in
May 2018.34 Article 17 of the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) will give citizens a right to prevent the distribution of their
personal data (including the removal of links to personal data, and the
cessation of copying said data) if one of four conditions is met.3 5 A
27. See LEXISNEXIS PRACTICE GUIDE: FLORIDA E-DISCOVERY AND EVIDENCE § 14.23[6]
(2017), LexisNexis (database updated May 2017) [hereinafter FLORIDA E-DISCOVERY AND
EVIDENCE PRACTICE GUIDE].
28. See id.
29. Id. § 14.23[8]; see also Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The
Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 13 (2000).
30. FLORIDA E-DISCOVERY AND EVIDENCE PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 27, § 14.23[9].
31. Id.
32. See Shaffer, supra note 29, at 16-20.
33. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2012).
Unlike Directive 95/46, which is a binding goal that member states may unilaterally decide how
to implement, a regulation would be immediately binding on all member states. See Francoise
Gilbert, European Data Protection 2.0: New Compliance Requirements in Sight-What the
Proposed EU Data Protection Regulation Means for U.S. Companies, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 815, 817 n.8 (2012).
34. See Natasha Lomas, European Parliament Adopts Tough New Data Protection Rules,
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 14, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/14/european-parliament-adopts-
tough-new-data-protection-rules/ [https://perma.cclM6R8-U6LE].
35. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
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person can have her data removed if (1) "the data are no longer
necessary" for the purpose "for which they were collected or otherwise
processed," (2) she withdraws her consent (if consent was required) or
the storage period to which she consented expires, (3) she formally
objects to the use of her data as unnecessary for a stated use, or (4) the
processing of the data violates another part of the regulation.36
The provisions allowing companies to retain personal data are
mostly narrow, such as academic research, public health, and existing
legal obligations.37 However, Article 17 does provide an exception for
freedom of expression in limited circumstances, such as artistic
expression.38
The right to be forgotten entered the public consciousness in
the United States through the 2014 European Court of Justice (ECJ)
decision in Google v. Spain.39 The case began in 2010, when Mario
Costeja Gonzdlez of Spain requested Google remove links to two
articles published in 1998, both describing a foreclosure auction of his
house for failing to pay his debts, from the search results for his
name.40 Mr. Costeja Gonzdlez claimed the decade-old matter had been
resolved and was "now entirely irrelevant"; consequently, the articles
should be removed from his Google search results.41  The court
concluded the information, although it had been lawfully published,
had indeed become less valuable over time. Thus, the public's interest
in being able to find information about a person (especially a
nonpublic person) no longer outweighed Mr. Costeja Gonzdlez's
fundamental rights.42 The ECJ ordered Google to remove the links
from the search results for Mr. Costeja Gonzilez's name.43
In the year following the ECJ's decision, Google received
905,000 requests to have links removed from search engine results.44




37. See id. at 52.
38. Id. at 52, 94.
39. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD)
2014 E.C.R. 317; see Paul de Hert & Vagelis Papakonstantinou, How the European Google
Decision May Have Nothing to Do with a Right to Be Forgotten, INT'L ASS'N PRIVACY PROFS.
(June 19, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/how-the-european-google-decision-may-have-nothing-to-
do-with-a-right-to-be/ [https://perma.cclWG57-8TMR].
40. See Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 14.
41. Id. 1 15.
42. See id. T 96-97.
43. Id. ¶ 100.
44. See Jabeen Bhatti, EU Right to Be Forgotten Decision: One Year, Almost 1M
Requests Later, BLOOMBERG BNA: COMPUTER TECH. L. REP. (May 5, 2015).
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Of those requests, about 41 percent were approved after consideration
by Google staff.4 5 This means that over 370,000 links were removed
from search engine results in the first year, potentially hindering all
sorts of information gathering-from background checks to news
reporting.
The right to be forgotten is not without pitfalls, especially
because it is often difficult to know what information will be useful in
the future. Consider Sasha, a hypothetical private citizen who
successfully requests Google remove all information about her from
search results of her name on June 30. The next day, Sasha performs
a newsworthy act of heroism. Reporters will struggle to tell the
newsworthy story of Sasha's heroism because it will be very difficult to
find information about her. If Sasha had waited until July 2, the day
after her heroism, she would not have been able to remove her
information because it would be important to the public. However,
because Sasha requested removal before her heroism, valuable
information about our heroine will not be easily available on Google at
the time when reporters and the public want it most. The right to be
forgotten removes content from the public space without recognizing it
may become vital public information in the future. This danger of
removing important information from the public sphere is one of the
main reasons the right to be forgotten has failed to become a part of
US law.46
Fundamentally, European countries have approached privacy
from an individual human rights perspective, while the United States
tends to favor industry self-regulation and views information (rather
than privacy) as a right.47 Other scholars have framed this cultural
difference as a clash between a US conception of privacy as a property
right that can be bargained away and a European view that privacy
encompasses a human dignity that cannot be exchanged or removed.48
The GDPR demonstrates the depth of Europe's commitment to the
45. See id.
46. See Jeffrey Abramson, Searching for Reputation: Reconciling Free Speech and the
'ight to Be Forgotten", 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 73 (2015).
47. See CURTIs D. FRYE, PRIVACY-ENHANCED BUSINESS: ADAPTING TO THE ONLINE
ENVIRONMENT 75 (2001). The US view has led some individual companies to experiment with
self-imposed privacy rights. For example, the Tampa Bay Times formed a committee in
September 2016 to explore removing old news stories from its website for right to be forgotten-
type reasons. See Terry Carter, Erasing the News: Should Some Stories Be Forgotten?, ABA J.
(Jan. 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/right-to-be-forgotten-US_1aw
[https://perma.cc/3UBA-6498].
48. Gail Lasprogata, Nancy J. King & Sukanya Pillay, Regulation of Electronic Employee
Monitoring: Identifying Fundamental Principles of Employee Privacy Through a Comparative
Study of Data Privacy Legislation in the European Union, United States and Canada, 2004 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 4, Dec. 2004, ¶f 7-9.
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idea that part of human dignity is to control "one's image, name, and
reputation" and that governmental regulation can play a vital role in
that process.49 Americans, who tend to view privacy as a freedom
from government intrusion into private decisions and spaces, have
rejected any right to be forgotten-style intrusion into the space of
private businesses like Google.50
B. The Right to Be Forgotten in the United States and Its Hurdles
Although polls have found strong support among Americans for
a right to be forgotten, no such right formally exists at the federal
level.51 However, a variety of US policymakers have contemplated the
right to be forgotten, albeit on a lesser scale than the EU version.52 In
2011, Representative Edward Markey proposed the Do Not Track Kids
Act.5 3 The bill proposed a right for minors to obtain any personal
information held by a website and to have any inaccurate personal
information erased or corrected.54 Although limited to Americans
under age seventeen, the bill (and its subsequent iterations) has come
the closest to a national legislative right to be forgotten in the United
States.55  California passed a similar law in 2013 that requires
websites to remove, upon request, any information posted by a
minor.56
The FTC has taken the lead in attempting to impose at least
minimal rights to be forgotten, even for adults. For example, in 2012
the FTC issued a report on protecting consumer privacy which
49. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004).
50. Id.
51. See Mario Trujillo, Public Wants 'Right to Be Forgotten' Online, HILL (Mar. 19, 2015,
9:12 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/236246-poll-public-wants-right-to-be-forgotten-
online [https://perma.cc/VHC4-ADG9]. For example, 88 percent of Americans surveyed supported
a law that would allow them to petition search engines to remove personal information from
search results, according to a 2015 survey. Id.
52. Since at least the aftermath of World War II, Europe has taken a stricter approach
to privacy, often more closely appr6ximating "strict scrutiny," while the United States has taken
a more sanguine approach to all privacy protections. See Marsha Cope Huie, Stephen F. Laribee
& Stephen D. Hogan, The Right to Privacy in Personal Data: The EU Prods the U.S. and
Controversy Continues, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 391, 456 (2002). This framework has led the
European Union to take a more aggressive legislative stance than the United States, which is
often concerned with constitutional free speech issues, as discussed below. See discussion supra
accompanying notes 47-50 for the European position and discussion infra accompanying notes
59-71 for the US position.
53. H.R. 1895, 112th Cong. (2011).
54. Id. § 5(b)(7).
55. See, e.g., H.R. 2734, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 1700, 113th Cong. (2013).
56. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22850-51 (West 2017).
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included "aspects of the proposed 'right to be forgotten,"' such as
calling on companies to "(1) delete consumer data that they no longer
need and (2) allow consumers to access their data and in appropriate
cases suppress or delete it."@5 The FTC has also attempted to enforce
a minimal right to be forgotten, such as a 2011 consent decree that
required Facebook to prevent third parties from accessing information
users had deleted (either by deleting the specific information or
deleting their accounts) within thirty days of the deletion.5 8
However, many US scholars recognize that the First
Amendment presents a substantial hurdle to any right to be forgotten
like that in the European Union.59 For one thing, "longstanding First
Amendment principles" typically refuse to "punish[] the dissemination
of truthful information relevant to the public interest."60 Although the
"public interest" serves as a small opening through which a right to be
forgotten could emerge, the thrust of current cases has been so "broad
a brush [as to] essentially render[] the public significance test moot."6 1
Furthermore, US jurisprudence has long considered information that
was originally distributed to the public, such as a person's name in a
public court document, de facto public interest information (although
this was in cases where the public document concerned a pending or
recent case, not a decades old one).62 As Eugene Volokh has pointed
out, this approach meshes with the general understanding that no one
has a property right to facts in the copyright sphere.63 As one
commentator noted, "[tihere is a strong, if misguided, tendency in US
law to discount the significance of privacy in public."6 4 US law has




58. Facebook, Inc., File No. 092-3184, at 4 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Nov. 29, 2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/11/111129facebookagree.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZA4W-6JGE].
59. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014)
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion [https://perma.cc/Z4M7-KQU]
("The American regard for freedom of speech, reflected in the First Amendment, guarantees that
the Costeja judgment would never pass muster under U.S. law.").
60. Franz Werro, The Right to Inform v. the Right to Be Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash
293 (Georgetown Ctr. for Transnat'l Legal Studies Colloquium, Research Paper No. 2, 2009),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=1401357 [https://perma.cclWW6U-R6JA].
61. Id. at 296.
62. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975).
63. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1079-80
(2000).
64. Anita L. Allen, Dredging up the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 47, 59 (2008).
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little sympathy for right to be forgotten cases, like Mr. Costeja
Gonzalez's in the European Union, which often stem from truthful
reporting of information that would (in the past) have been public but
rarely accessible.65
US scholars have further attacked the right to be forgotten on
more philosophical grounds.66 "The idea of granting a privacy right
that stems from obscurity flies in the face of long-standing First
Amendment theory and fundamental free speech principles," asserted
one scholar.6 7 One frequently cited concern is that the removal of
once-public information would damage the discourse and ability of
others to form or express opinions, implicating the principle of
self-fulfillment or expression.68 Another fundamental concern is the
vibrancy of the marketplace of ideas. For example, Lior Strahilevitz
has asserted that "[t]he First Amendment implications of limiting a
defendant's ability to disclose facts are more troublesome than the
implications of limiting a defendant's ability to gather facts," which is
why invasion of privacy torts have encountered fewer First
Amendment problems than public disclosure torts.69
65. See, e.g., Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 553 (2d Cir. 2015). The Supreme
Court accepted an accessibility-memorability rationale in the Freedom of Information Act
context, when the Court wrote that
[t]he privacy interest in a rap sheet is substantial. The substantial character of that
interest is affected by the fact that in today's society the computer can accumulate and
store information that would otherwise have surely been forgotten long before a
person attains age 80, when the FBI's rap sheets are discarded.
U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989). The
Court also recognized that "there is a vast difference between the public records that might be
found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations
throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of
information." Id. at 764. This recognition has largely not, however, been applied to create an
affirmative right that can be used against private actors.
66. See, e.g., McKay Cunningham, Free Expression, Privacy, and Diminishing
Sovereignty in the Information Age: The Internationalization of Censorship, 69 ARK. L. REV. 71,
72 (2016); Robert G. Larson III, Forgetting the First Amendment: How Obscurity-Based Privacy
and a Right to Be Forgotten Are Incompatible with Free Speech, 18 COMM. L. & POL'Y 91, 93
(2013); Miquel Peguera, The Shaky Ground of the Right to Be Delisted, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 507, 512-13 (2016); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007,
2033 (2010).
67. Larson, supra note 66, at 108.
68. Id. at 111; see also Eric Goldman, California's New 'Online Eraser' Law Should Be
Erased, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2013, 1:35 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/09/24/
californias-new-online-eraser-law-should-be-erased/#47fcc6f67a33 [https://perma.cclHZU2-SFSC]
("Many UGC [user-generated content] websites encourage users to engage each other in
conversations through comments and threaded discussions. Removing a piece of the discussion
can make the entire thread nonsensical.").
69. Strahilevitz, supra note 66, at 2033.
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The possibility of information not being released (and therefore
not being a part of the marketplace of ideas) is a greater concern than
channeling information gatherers into certain methods. Justice
Kennedy wrote that the marketplace "provides a forum where ideas
and information flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital,
some of slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker and the
audience, not the government, assess the value of the information
presented."70 The First Amendment places a premium on the free flow
of information once it is known, whether this principle is framed as a
search for truth or the workings of the marketplace of ideas.71
Technology companies' executives have also disputed the
fairness and efficacy of a right to be forgotten. Richard Allan,
Facebook's EU then-director of policy, likened the right to be forgotten
to "shoot[ing] the messenger" in 2011.72 Other commentators have
raised questions about how a right to be forgotten could possibly work
in a world where information is frequently reposted by others, often on
different platforms (so a statement might make its way from Facebook
to Twitter to a blog).73 These commentators point out that trying to
remove information from the Internet can become a game of
whack-a-mole, in which the information appears on new websites even
as it is taken down from others.74 While the private sector has
expressed a small willingness to voluntarily implement right to be
forgotten-like systems in a few niche areas, such as removing links to
revenge porn,75 it has generally refused to accept a broad right to be
forgotten.76
70. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).
71. See Whitman, supra note 49, at 1196 ("Freedom of expression is a value of
constitutional magnitude in the United States, whereas the protection of personal honor is not,
which means that freedom of expression almost always wins out."). Scholars have also framed
this difference in terms of viewing privacy as a matter of inherent dignity (EU) and liberty (US).
See id. Since the US conception focuses more on the ability of the actor to speak, rather than the
European concept of being protected, it follows that the First Amendment prioritizes the free
flow of information and views the actions taken to acquire information as more easily regulated.
See id.
72. Kelly Fiveash, Facebook Tells Privacy Advocates Not to 'Shoot the Messenger,
REGISTER (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/03/23/facebook-shoot-messenger/
[https://perma.cc/9Y8T-VTK9].
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., CITRON, supra note 11, at 47.
75. See Brian Fung, Microsoft Is Stepping up the War on Revenge Porn-And Validating




76. See KATHY ENGLISH, ASSOCIATED PRESS MEDIA EDITORS, THE LONGTAIL OF NEWS:
TO UNPUBLISH OR NOT TO UNPUBLISH 6 (2009), http://c.ymedn.com/sites/www.apme.com/
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In short, Europeans have taken the problem of truthful but
misleading information about individuals very seriously, often forcing
search engines to remove the links from searches of an individual's
name to protect her privacy. Short of rewriting its Constitution, it
seems unlikely the United States will follow suit. US law prizes the
free flow of information and preserves past reporting of truthful facts
even if the availability of the information causes significant harms to
individuals.77
III. THE SOLUTION: AMEND THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
As discussed above, the European approach to the right to be
forgotten is largely untenable in the United States for technical and
First Amendment reasons. US law disapproves of the idea of
removing truthful content from the public sphere, even if it does more
harm than good. However, this currently leaves individuals in the
United States without any redress for deeply harmful practices. To
strike a balance that leaves the content available to the public while
redressing some of the impact on victims, this Article proposes a
flagging system-enforced by the FTC-for search engine links that
are truthful but misleading. When a would-be employer or landlord
sees a flag on a damaging link, she knows to discount that link;
otherwise, she might give it too much weight in her evaluation, based
on psychological biases.8 This Part first considers and rejects some
alternatives to the flagging system that are already available under
US law. Second, it describes the flagging system and how it would
operate. Third, it explains why the flagging system is an effective
solution-both compared to the right of reply system proposed by
scholars and in its own right as a psychological debiasing mechanism.
Finally, this Part discusses the flagging system's compliance with
existing First Amendment law.
resource/resmgr/onlinejournalism-credibility/1ong-tailreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TWF-
QBDF] (noting that only 20.9 percent of Canadian and US news editors might agree to remove a
newspaper story containing outdated, yet accurate, information that may be damaging to the
source's reputation in the community).
77. See Leslie E. Minora, Comment, U.S. Courts Should Not Let Europe's "Right to Be
Forgotten" Force the World to Forget, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 609, 627 (2017).
78. The simultaneous presentation of the link and the flag is especially important to
assist in debiasing because confirmation bias (the overweighting of information that supports
what a person already believes) increases as individuals move through their research process.
See Eva Jonas et al., Confirmation Bias in Sequential Information Search After Preliminary
Decisions: An Expansion of Dissonance Theoretical Research on Selective Exposure to
Information, 80 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 557, 560 (2001) (finding increased confirmation
bias when information is selected sequentially).
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A. Why Not Existing Tort Law?
Existing tort law does not provide a remedy for individuals who
are being harmed by truthful but misleading information. Two
leading causes of action-defamation law and public disclosure of
private facts-are unavailable because of the truthfulness and
newsworthiness of the information at the time of publication.79 This
Section briefly describes these two causes of action and explains why
they do not provide relief to this class of plaintiffs, who are left with no
legal protections in the current US system.
1. Defamation Law Does Not Apply to Truth
A plaintiff in a defamation case must prove four elements: "(a)
a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an
unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least
to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability
of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special
harm caused by the publication."80
The problem for plaintiffs who have true but misleading
information, such as a mistaken arrest, is the statement published is
not false. As the Second Circuit put it, "[i]t is axiomatic, of course,
that truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim."81 In fact,
publishers can even avoid liability for a report that turns out to be
false, as long as they did not display a "reckless disregard for the
truth" and were reporting on a matter of public concern.82
Furthermore, whether or not a publisher can be held liable
turns on whether the publisher displayed reckless disregard at the
time of publication.83 For example, a New Jersey newspaper was
found not liable for defamation when it ran a front page "teaser"
headline reporting that two local men had been "arrested" when they
had not.84 Although the plaintiffs had been charged in a civil case and
not arrested, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found there was no
reason to believe the "harried editor" did not believe the headline he
wrote was accurate when he published it.86 The US Supreme Court
itself has found "factual errors"-including "half-truths" and
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977); infra Part
III.A. 1-2.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558.
81. Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 552 (2d Cir. 2015).
82. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1974).
83. See, e.g., Durando v. Nutley Sun, 37 A.3d 449, 462 (N.J. 2012).
84. Id. at 452.
85. Id. at 452, 462.
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"misinformation"-can be protected from defamation liability if the
publication concerned the actions of a public official and was not made
with "actual malice."86  Therefore, an erroneous report about a
truthful event is unlikely to result in liability, even if it has a large
impact on the employability of the plaintiff.87
Another potential avenue of liability typically denied to
plaintiffs in truthful news cases is defamation by implication.
Defamation by implication occurs when "a publication implies
something false and defamatory by omitting or strategically
juxtaposing key facts" even when the statements are literally true
when considered in isolation.88 This cause of action runs into the
same timing problem as a typical defamation claim. The root problem
in misleading information cases is often that the publication is not
updated with later information, but the tort is analyzed at the time of
publication.89 For example, in Martin v. Hearst Corp., a woman
claimed defamation by implication because an online news story noted
that she had been arrested and criminally charged, even though the
case was later nolled.90 The Second Circuit rejected the argument that
she had been defamed by implication because "reasonable readers"
would not assume she had been convicted based on the arrest report
and, although the story was not "as complete a story as [she] would
like, . . . it implie[d] nothing false about her."91  Because future
liability is tied to the time an Internet news story is published,
plaintiffs cannot bring claims based on later developments. If a
journalist cannot know the future developments in a story, she cannot
be liable for implying something might happen in the future.
Although a helpful rule for journalists, this rule prevents innocent
parties from counteracting the harms to their interests and
reputations caused by outdated news stories years later.
86. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-73, 279-80 (1964).
87. Similarly, scholars have argued that the determinations of what is relevant by
search engines cannot be "false" and thus would not be actionable under existing tort law. See
Luke Pettyjohn, Note, Preventing an Ex Machina Future: Search Engine Speech and the Advisor
Theory, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 462, 484-85 (2016) (discussing how a search engine's
determination of relevance cannot be "false," and thus is not actionable under existing tort law).
88. See Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 552 (2d Cir. 2015).
89. See, e.g., Tomblin v. WHCS-TV8, 434 F. App'x 205, 211 (4th Cir. 2011) (analyzing a
defamation claim based on the knowledge of the speaker at time of publication); Stepanov v. Dow
Jones & Co., 987 N.Y.S.2d 37, 42 (App. Div. 2014) (same).
90. Martin, 777 F.3d at 549.
91. Id. at 553.
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2. Public Disclosure of Private Facts Does Not Apply to News
With defamation's truth and time of publication barriers
looking insurmountable, an appealing cause of action may be public
disclosure of private facts. According to the Second Restatement of
Torts,
[o]ne who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized
is of q kind thnt (n) would he highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not
of legitimate concern to the public.
9 2
The Restatement notes it is not entirely clear whether liability
under this tort is constitutional at all,9 3 but liability certainly cannot
attach to the publication of true facts that are a matter of public
record.94  These limitations eliminate many of the most crucial
categories of information that might be misleading, such as arrests
and bankruptcies, because these are matters of public record.
Furthermore, courts have not restricted "legitimate concern to
the public" to matters of public record. The Restatement notes that
"[i]ncluded within the scope of legitimate public concern are matters of
the kind customarily regarded as 'news.' To a considerable extent, in
accordance with the mores of the community, the publishers and
broadcasters have themselves defined the term."95 This definition of
public concern creates a huge obstacle to plaintiffs who wish to sue
news organizations for disclosing private facts: if the exception
extends to anything that is news, and news is defined by publishers
and broadcasters, almost no case against a publisher or broadcaster
will be outside the exception. This exception has been used broadly to
find no liability for a vast array of information, such as reporting
about an automobile accident involving only private figures,96 the
sexual orientation of a man who helped prevent the assassination of
President Ford,97 and a sporting event featuring a photo of a man with
his fly down.98 Given the broad reach of public concern in these cases,
it will be hard for any plaintiff to prove a truthfully reported story was
so beyond the pale of privacy invasion as to warrant liability.
For example, consider the hypothetical case of John Doe. John
attends a party and afterwards is so intoxicated that he runs naked
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
93. Id. special note on Relation of § 652D to the First Amendment to the Constitution.
94. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. g.
96. See Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 488 (Cal. 1998).
97. See Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666, 671 (Ct. App. 1984).
98. See Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858, 859, 861 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
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down a public street before falling asleep in his car. Although he is
not arrested, a newspaper publishes a story about John's antics,
perhaps to demonstrate the prevalence of wild parties in the
neighborhood. It turns out that John rarely drinks, and in fact was
only so intoxicated on that night because another partygoer placed a
drug in his drink. Can John sue to recover for his harms, personal
and professional, under the public disclosure of private facts doctrine?
Probably not, because his wild antics are probably of legitimate
concern to the public, especially if couched in a broader story or series
of stories about drinking. For John, however, the broader story does
not matter-the story features him by name (and perhaps picture),
and he is losing credibility with employers who do not want to hire a
reckless "party boy." With liability off the table, a remedy that
mitigates these future harms may be the only help John can get from
the US legal system. John needs a flag.
B. How the Flagging System Would Work
A flagging system would provide much-needed relief to
plaintiffs who cannot pursue a European-style right to be forgotten
claim or a tort claim in the United States. But how would it work?
The first step is to create an authorizing statute, allowing plaintiffs to
bring requests for flags to the FTC, which has already established
itself as a privacy and consumer protection watchdog.99 The FTC
would adjudicate these complaints, with administrative law judges
acting as factfinder for the parties (the plaintiff and the search
engine).100 These adjudications, performed in compliance with the
99. See What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/82DM-S2YK] (last visited Sept. 21, 2017).
100. See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission's Investigative and Law
Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-
do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cclW5B3-XP7E] (last visited Sept. 21, 2017). It may
seem intuitive to allow authors or publishers to intervene and defend their links, especially since
a flag may reduce traffic to the news story in question. Remember, however, that a flag is only
displayed on the results of a specific search, not on the article itself or every search on which the
article might appear. For example, suppose an article concerns three people-Annie, Bob, and
Collin-who are arrested by police officer Patrick. If Annie successfully has a flag added to the
story, the flag will be displayed only on the search results of Annie's name. A search for Bob,
Collin, or Patrick will show the link without the flag, since the information may not be
misleading with regard to them. This search-specific structure greatly reduces the interest of
authors and publishers in the flag. Therefore, the adjudication is not intended to include authors
or publications as parties. However, the flexibility of administrative adjudication would allow the
FTC to include an author or publication as an intervener if it decided an author or publication
had a legitimate interest in a specific case that was not being vindicated by the conventional
parties.
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Administrative Procedure Act,101 could then be appealed through the
agency and eventually to federal district court. This system has
several benefits: it creates a unified body of case law as to what
constitutes misleading information, it is consistent with the FTC's
expertise, and it costs less than alternative methods of adjudication,
such as federal district courts.102
A new statutory right could remove several hurdles that plague
the US tort system, especially if it explicitly covers truthful
information, is pegged to the time of the adjudication (rather than the
time of publication),10 3 and takes advantage of the expertise and value
of an administrative agency. The statute itself might go something
like this, amending 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) to add a subsection that reads
as follows:
Upon receipt of a complaint from a natural person, the Federal Trade Commission
shall, on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, determine whether
the contested link or links in a given search is misleading, meaning the private
harm of the information substantially outweighs the public benefit at the time of
the adjudication, such as by inaccurately implying a criminal history or continued
financial insolvency. If it finds the link misleading, the Commission shall require
an interactive computer service1 04 to place a small flag or insignia next to the link
or links in question as well as text stating "Warning: this page may be truthful but
misleading as to the subject of your search." The service may choose to provide a
link to the agency decision or further information about decisions under this
subsection but is not required to do so. An interactive computer service may file a
complaint with the Commission to have a flag removed at a later time if new
information is revealed that may change the balance of private harms and public
benefits.
This hypothetical statute would provide the FTC with the
flexibility to recognize that information may have different value to
101. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2012)).
102. See Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907, 918 & n.53 (2004) (arguing that expertise and procedural efficiencies
should make patent administrative proceedings "significantly cheaper" than trial court
litigation); Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Trials: The Bankruptcy Experience, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 913, 931, 937 (2004) (describing bankruptcy proceedings as cheaper than district
court proceedings for individuals); see also Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative
Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 334 (1991) (contending that PTO made patent law "more unified
and clear"); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1160 (1990) (arguing that specialized administrators provide uniformity
in technical areas more cheaply than generalist courts).
103. See supra Part III.A.
104. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2012) (defining "interactive computer service" as "any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access
by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions").
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different people at different times. For example, a recent arrest in an
open case, even if charges are not pressed at the time, may be a
valuable piece of information for prospective employers and landlords.
However, once the case is closed and the actual perpetrator brought to
justice, the information is much less valuable. This is a more
moderate approach than that taken by the European right to be
forgotten1 0 5-the links are still available to every searcher, and the
flags are only placed on the links when a specific search term (likely
the person's name) is used.106 Moreover, this system takes advantage
of many well-known advantages of using administrative agencies:
uniformity, expertise, and reduced cost.1 07
Since search results are necessarily interstate affairs available
to anyone, uniformity is critical to providing a fair system. Scholars
have criticized defamation law, which is governed by state law, as a
"field that cries out for . . . uniformity," especially in the context of
online defamation.10 8 Imagine the not-unlikely case of two sisters, one
of whom lives in State A while the other lives across the border in
State B. Under current law, it is entirely feasible that a single article
describing a raucous family reunion could generate liability for the
newspaper in State A but not in State B. Piecemeal state standards
105. See supra Part IIA; see also Beata A. Safari, Comment, Intangible Privacy Rights:
How Europe's GDPR Will Set a New Global Standard for Personal Data Protection, 47 SETON
HALL L. REV. 809, 820-22 (2017).
106. One can dream up law professor hypotheticals in which a future employer searches
for two candidates (Annie and Bob) and finds incriminating information about the same
candidate (say, Bob) in both searches. Because the flag would show up only in the search for
Bob's name (and not the search of Annie's name), Bob may not get the full benefit of the flag as
in the typical case. This is a necessary limitation of making the right easily administrable for
search engines (requiring flags only for a few designated searches) and narrowly tailored to fit
the problem in a typical case (where the problem arises either from the search results that show
up for a person's name or from search results that show up for his name and other identifiers,
like current city).
107. The first year or two may likely face a larger volume of requests as the pent-up
demand for protection is released. Based on data released by Google on its right to be forgotten
requests, it appears many will be meritorious. See Sylvia Tippmann & Julia Powles, Google
Accidentally Reveals Data on 'Right to Be Forgotten' Requests, GUARDIAN (July 14, 2015, 9:28
AM), https://www.theguardian.comtechnology/2015/jul/14/google-accidentally-reveals-right-to-
be-forgotten-requests [https://perma.cc/H76V-MNUM] (reporting that in the first ten months
after Google v. Spain, Google granted nearly half of all 218,320 requests by private individuals to
have links removed). Furthermore, one of the benefits of an agency adjudication is to strike a
balance between creating a cheap tool that is easy to misuse (such as, for example, a Digital
Millennium Copyright Act takedown notice) and a prohibitively expensive one that prevents
individuals from bringing meritorious claims (such as, for example, a federal court complaint).
See Warren, supra note 102, at 937; see also Bruff, supra note 102, at 334; Revesz, supra note
102, at 1160.
108. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 945 (2000).
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are not an ideal way to protect individuals or regulate the conduct of
defendants.
Because the flagging system would be administered by the
FTC, defendants would have one go-to source for precedent and
complaints they may want to reopen. Suppose, for example, an
individual goes through the flag request and prosecution process and
has a flag placed on a newspaper article about her bankruptcy from
three years ago, which she argued was due to her then-husband's
gambling. Two years later, she files for bankruptcy again. The search
engine would like to go back and remove the flag from her first
bankruptcy, since it now appears relevant and not misleading. If the
initial flag had been placed by a federal district court, the correct
venue for the flag removal would be difficult to ascertain-is it the
district court where the individual currently resides? Where she
resided at the time of the original flagging adjudication? Where the
search engine is headquartered? Where the publication is based? An
agency proceeding solves these problems by providing a single locus of
authority and jurisdiction.
As discussed above, the FTC has established itself as the
leading federal watchdog of consumer privacy, in part by calling on
companies to help individuals control the information about them that
is held or published by Internet companies.109  Perhaps more
importantly, the FTC has been tasked with balancing harms to
consumers against potential benefits to companies and other
consumers.1 0  Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
specifically charges the FTC with policing "unfair" trade practices,
where unfairness is defined as conduct "likely to cause substantial
injury to consumers which . . . is not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition." 11  This standard is
substantially similar to the standard for misleadingness in the
proposed flagging system (whether the private harm of the
information substantially outweighs the public benefit at the time of
the adjudication).1 12 In fact, the FTC already regulates "misleading"
109. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 57, at 1 ("These best practices include making
privacy the 'default setting' for commercial data practices and giving consumers greater control
over the collection and use of their personal data through simplified choices and increased
transparency. Implementing these best practices will enhance trust and stimulate commerce.").
110. See Shawn A. Johnson, A Law and Economics Approach to Privacy Policy
Misstatements: Considering the Need for a Cost-Benefit Analysis in the FTC's Deception
Framework, 18 COLUM. SC. & TECH. L. REV. 79, 90 (2016).
111. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012)).
112. See supra Part III.B ("[The FTC will] determine whether the contested link or links
in a given search is misleading, meaning the private harm of the information substantially
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conduct when it prosecutes companies for engaging in deceptive
practices-which are material conduct "likely to mislead the consumer
acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's
detriment."113
The FTC has declined to further define "unfair" and "deceptive"
through rulemaking and has instead chosen to proceed through
adjudications to establish a body of common law-like precedent
(through consent decrees as well as outright litigation) of what
constitutes an "unfair" or "deceptive" practice in different
industries.1 1 4 Courts have emphasized the FTC needs flexibility in
order to respond to emerging problems.115 Similarly, the lack of
definition in "misleading" beyond a similar balancing test in the
flagging system will allow the FTC the discretion it needs to develop a
body of case law concerning the exact contours of "misleading"
information in online search results.
A large part of the misleading analysis will be governed by the
contents of each link and the amount of time since the events in
question, but initial direction could be taken from the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA), also enforced by the FTC, which bars consumer
reporting agencies from providing information on bankruptcies,
lawsuits and judgments, paid tax liens, and records of arrest or
indictment after a certain period of time.1 16 Like the flagging system,
the FCRA seeks to prevent decision makers from using outdated
information, while recognizing the information may still be relevant in
select contexts.11 7  The easiest case in the flagging system is
information that could not be included in a consumer report under the
FCRA-such as a bankruptcy from fifteen years earlier. A slightly
harder case, but one likely still covered by the flagging system, is a
outweighs the public benefit at the time of the adjudication, such as by inaccurately implying a
criminal history or continued financial insolvency.").
113. Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to John D. Dingell,
Chairman, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983),
https://www.ftc.gov/systemlfiles/documents/public-statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf
[https://perma.cclK7W4-FGX9].
114. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 618-19
(D.N.J. 2014).
115. Id. at 621 ("mhe Court must consider the untenable consequence of accepting Hotels
and Resorts' proposal: the FTC would have to cease bringing all unfairness actions without first
proscribing particularized prohibitions-a result that is in direct contradiction with the
flexibility necessarily inherent in Section 5 of the FTC Act." (emphasis in original)).
116. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 601-22, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128-36
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81x (2012)).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(b) (2012) (stating that the barred categories of information can
still be provided if the consumer report is being used in a credit transaction worth over
$150,000).
22 [Vol. 20: 1: 1
SEARCH ENGINE FLAGS
type of information covered by the FCRA but outside its time barriers,
such as an arrest that is only five years old. The marginal case is one
completely outside the information covered by the FCRA, such as a
news story covering a person's drunken antics in college.
Content and age will be most influential in these borderline
cases. If the drunken antics occurred only two years ago and involved
screaming racist epithets at passersby, they probably would not be
flagged. If they occurred five years ago and involved screaming
quotations from Shakespeare, by contrast, they might be flagged. This
inquiry is similar to the balancing federal courts do under Rule 403 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which asks courts to weigh probative
value against the likelihood of prejudice.118 Judges are trusted to
engage in this balancing effectively, just as the flagging system calls
for trust that the administrative law judge will properly balance
private harm and public benefit.
The most important thing to remember is the flagging system
is less powerful than existing rules like the FCRA or right to be
forgotten. No content is removed and no one is barred from viewing or
using the information.119 The flagging system seeks only to remedy
irrational decision-making, where decision makers place too much
emphasis on a single piece of information. What is "misleading" or
"relevant" to an individual decision maker may vary, which is why the
continued accessibility of the content is preserved. Consider two
couples-Priscilla and Danielle, and Paul and David. Suppose both
Priscilla and Paul think their partners are exhibiting strange behavior
that borders on stalking, and they each search for more information
about their partner online. Danielle had a college arrest for
possession of marijuana that was never prosecuted, while David was
accused by his college newspaper of stalking a professor. Even if both
of these are flagged as "misleading," Paul is likely to view the
information about prior stalking accusations as very relevant and
similar to his concerns. This is therefore high-value information to
him, and he is able to use it. On the other hand, Priscilla does not
learn much about Danielle from the college arrest-this is low-value
information-and the flag may help prevent Priscilla from
generalizing that the arrest means Danielle is a "bad person" or has
"criminal tendencies."
118. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 688 (1988).
119. See Meredith Schramm-Strosser, The "Not So" Fair Credit Reporting Act: Federal
Preemption, Injunctive Relief, and the Need to Return Remedies for Common Law Defamation to
the States, 14 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 165, 185 (2012) (summarizing information removal and
modification provision of the FCRA).
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The final benefit of using an administrative agency to
administer this proposal is reduced costs. On the most basic level, the
FTC has the necessary experience and specialized knowledge to
quickly adjudicate these claims, so the proposal saves significant time
compared to having a federal or state court judge attempt to
understand the law of search engines and perform the proper
balancing.120 Furthermore, adjudication by administrative agencies is
generally understood to be less costly for the parties than adjudication
in federal court.121 An administrative agency adjudication strikes an
optimal balance between providing a costly screen to weed out
frivolous claims, while also keeping this remedy available to as many
worthy plaintiffs as possible.122 The FTC also has the ability to define
certain procedures to raise or lower costs to further perfect this
balance-for example, by establishing the procedure through which
individuals file their complaints and setting the rules of evidence
admissible in the adjudication.123
On the broadest level, this flagging system meshes both the
European and US conceptions of privacy: it vindicates the dignity of
individuals by allowing them to take an autonomous action, while also
refusing to censor or punish a speaker for publishing information. It
stakes out a middle ground between the content removal of the right
to be forgotten and the remediless state of US tort law. Furthermore,
the flagging system takes advantage of uniformity, expertise, and cost
reductions afforded by administrative agencies.
120. See William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 977
(2016) (stating that the FTC imposes the most privacy obligations on commercial entities in the
United States); Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 105, 108-09 (2010) (detailing FTC
regulation of search engines).
121. See Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public
Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI-KENT L. REV. 521, 548 (2006).
122. Arguably the cheapest possible process is one similar to the right to be forgotten in
Europe, which is handled directly by search engines. See Carter, supra note 47. Nothing prevents
search engines from offering this service directly. However, a legal right adjudicated by would-be
defendants would violate the notion of a neutral adjudicator, which is considered essential for
due process, so a decision in a search engine's private process could not preempt the FTC
flagging process. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
123. See Mila Sohoni, The Power to Privilege, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 545 (2015)
("Agencies are therefore old hands at writing agency-level rules of procedure and even agency-
level rules of evidence, rules that frequently deviate from the federal rules in order to promote




Striking a middle ground between total removal and a total
lack of remedies is a noble goal, but the flagging system must be able
to stand on its own merits. This Section first situates the flagging
system in the wider scholarship that has sought to solve this problem,
especially the right of reply literature. The flagging system is more
consistent with the First Amendment and presents less potential for
abuse than a right of reply system. Second, this Section makes the
affirmative case for why a flagging system would provide a benefit to
plaintiffs. It discusses two psychological phenomena-confirmation
bias and negativity bias-and explains why these may cause readers
to irrationally overvalue the negative but misleading information from
online news articles unless a flagging system is used to counteract
these biases. Finally, it briefly discusses why search results rather
than individual pages are the ideal target of regulation.
1. Why Not a Right of Reply?
The flagging system may remind readers of Professor Frank
Pasquale's 2006 paper, in which he proposed that search engines
provide a right of reply by placing an asterisk next to "objectionable"
results that linked to the complainant's own website giving her "side
of the story."124 A similar proposal, limited to defamatory material,
advocated a similar right of reply in exchange for Section 230
immunity. 125 Pasquale's proposal was criticized as technically
ineffective (people may switch to other search engines) while
simultaneously "inhibit[ing] the development of better, more helpful
responses," such as personalization technologies that deliver results
tailored to the searcher's interests.12 6 The proposed flagging system
mitigates these concerns by providing a forum for a single
adjudication against multiple search engines while providing the FTC
the flexibility to respond to future issues like personalization.
Furthermore, the idea of a full-fledged right of reply presents
two larger problems-compliance with the First Amendment and the
possibility that the right proves too powerful. On the First
Amendment front, the Supreme Court explicitly held a right of reply
124. Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
115, 135-36 (2006).
125. See Michael D. Scott, Would a "Right of Reply" Fix Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act?, 20 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 73, 73 (2011).
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requirement unconstitutional in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo. 12 7 Justice Brandeis once famously declared that in First
Amendment cases "the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence."128 But, writing for the Court in Miami Herald, Chief
Justice Burger worried a right of reply would reduce speech overall
rather than increase it. The Court found a Florida right of reply
statute unconstitutional on the ground that it "exact[ed] a penalty on
the basis of the content of a [publication]."129 Forcing a newspaper to
publish a response to certain content (in Miami Herald, political
editorials) increases the costs of publishing that content and may
cause the newspaper to shift to less contentious material that is less
likely to generate a reply.130
Furthermore, the Court found even if there were no increased
costs, and thus no change in content, the right of reply would still be
unconstitutional as a violation of publications' editorial control.131 A
right of reply for search engine results or web page content could be
significantly less costly, but it still presents the overriding problem of
editorial control.
Forcing search engines to provide links to a complainant's
website is identical to forcing newspapers to provide response
editorials, while the flagging system is not. A right of reply forces the
publisher to provide the same type of content it normally provides in
the same form, but without the editorial control it normally asserts
over the decision to display that content.132 In contrast, the flagging
system does not force publishers to display content typically
considered to be within their editorial discretion. The proposed flags
are different in form from the content search engines typically
provide, because they are not links.
The flagging system strikes a balance between Justice
Brandeis's desire to counter speech with more speech and Chief
Justice Burger's fear that removing editorial control will lead to
reduced speech. In the vein of combating speech with more speech, a
flag provides additional information to the reader by including an
explicit explanation of what the flag means (that the information is
true but may mislead the reader). However, the flag does not
127. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
128. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
129. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 256.
130. Id. at 257.
131. Id. at 258.
132. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 653 (1994); Elad Peled,




exacerbate Chief Justice Burger's worry that publishers (in this case,
search engines) will publish less controversial content because of the
rule.133 Flags are not automatically compulsory, demand no action on
the part of the actual speaker (the author of the web page), and do not
require the search engine to provide links with which it disagrees. In
the political editorial context in which Miami Herald was issued, a
right of reply requires publishing a responsive editorial that conflicts
with the newspaper's statements or beliefs, while a flagging system is
analogous to requiring the initial story be labeled as an editorial.134
The latter is unlikely to threaten editorial discretion or the decision of
what to publish, while adding an additional bit of information to the
reader's experience.
Rights of reply also present the possibility of going too far and
providing complainants an overly powerful megaphone for their own
(potentially unrelated) speech. Professor James Grimmelmann, for
example, responded to Pasquale by asking whether President George
W. Bush could demand a right to reply to "every progressive blog."135
The ability to drive readers to the complainant's website makes a
right of reply an enticing opportunity to anyone who wants to spread
her views. Everything looks like a nail when using a hammer confers
a benefit on the user. This overuse problem is intrinsic to the right of
reply-the more benefits a right confers, the more attractive its use
appears.
Finally, the right of reply-as described by Pasquale-does not
adequately constrain complainants to use the right only to address the
actual problem.136 Pasquale proposes no formal restraints on what the
website linked to through the asterisk could say, although he proposes
it go to the complainant's website.137 Suppose the first search result
for Jane Doe's name is a story of a drug arrest, which later turns out
was based on a case of mistaken identity-Jane was never involved in
the distribution of illegal drugs.138 Jane receives an asterisk on the
133. See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 257 ("Faced with the penalties that would accrue to
any newspaper that published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-
access statute, editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy.").
134. See id. at 255-56.
135. Grimmelmann, supra note 126, at 51.
136. See Pasquale, supra note 124, at 136.
137. See id. at 135-36.
138. See Mike Smith, Case of Mistaken Identity Lands Local Woman in Jail, STATE
GAZETTE (May 22, 2016), http://www.stategazette.com/story/2306887.html
[https://perma.cc/67A8-FEEF] (describing an incident in which US Marshals arrested the wrong
woman of the same name as a suspect for drug charges). Cases of mistaken identity arrests are
common: In 2016, a Santa Fe man was arrested on a warrant for drunk driving and drug charges
that had been issued for his dead brother. See Jeannie Nguyen, Santa Fe Man Sues After He's
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link to the news story about the drug arrest, which links to a page
where she can explain her side of the story. Although Jane benefits
from being able to set the record straight about the drugs, she now has
a platform that many people click on when they search her name
(even though her website is not the most reliable source of information
about her based on Google's algorithm). No one is keeping tabs on
what Jane posts on her website-she may begin only telling her side of
the drug arrest but may later expand the page to discuss how great
she is at her job. She may then expand the page to cover the arrest,
her qualifications, and her beliefs about immigration policy. Clearly,
giving the website such prominence is no longer justified for most of
its content. However, the cost of policing every individual's website
would be prohibitively astronomical (recall that Google received
905,000 requests from Europeans to have links delisted in the first
year after the right to be forgotten decision).139 Unlike a right of reply,
a flagging system does not give individuals the ability to present their
own content, and so it does not have these policing problems.
2. The Affirmative Case for Flags
Putting a flag on negative, misleading information may seem
counterintuitive. After all, if a person is concerned she will not be
considered for jobs or loans on the basis of this information, why draw
more attention to it? The answer to this question is twofold: first, the
people who select this remedy will be those who believe everyone is
already reading the information, and second, the flags will help
remove the biases of readers who would otherwise give this piece of
information too much weight (the "debiasing" function).
Scholars, employers, and lawmakers have long recognized
certain information can be damaging to a person's ability to get a job,
loan, or apartment. For example, the FCRA requires individuals be
given notice if a covered party takes an "adverse action" (such as not
Arrested on Deceased Brother's Warrant, KRQE NEWS 13 (May 26, 2017, 4:38 AM),
http://krqe.com/2017/05/25/santa-fe-man-sues-after-hes-arrested-on-deceased-brothers-warrant/
[https://perma.cc/3WMX-VCGV]. In 2012, an Indiana high school student was taken from his
home and beaten by police who were looking for his brother and had confused the two, both of
whom wore their hair in dreadlocks. Suzette Hackney, A Case Where Civil Rights Are Worth $1,
INDY STAR (Aug. 28, 2016, 11:45 PM), http://www.indystar.com/story/opinion/columnists/suzette-
hackney/2016/08/27/hackney-case-civil-rights-worthl8943 1286/ [https://perma.cc/AK5R-C9CC].
Even the US Supreme Court has made this mistake. The Court suspended and threatened to
disbar a Massachusetts litigator who shared the same first and last name with a convicted drunk
driver. See Mark Sherman, Supreme Court Suspends Wrong Lawyer over 'Mistaken Identity,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 30, 2017, 5:33 PM), http://www.wpxi.cominews/supreme-court-
suspends-wrong-lawyer-over-mistaken-identity/528062 190 [https://perma.cclYA7M-WF2D].
139. See Bhatti, supra note 44.
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giving a loan) as a result of negative information about a person's
"credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living." 140 However,
the individual must file a request if she wants to learn the exact
nature of the information that lost them the loan.1 4 1 Note that this
rule does not prohibit the use of this information in making the
decision; rather, it just prohibits making a decision on the basis of the
information and refusing to tell the applicant why. There is no similar
rule, however, for parties not covered by the FCRA or for areas not
reached by the FCRA, including employment and housing.
At least in the employment context, evaluating prospective
employees based on search results is rampant.142 Almost 80 percent of
employers use search engines to learn about job applicants, and
almost 70 percent of these will reject applicants based on what they
find. 143 More than half of employers reported they would reject a
candidate based on "concerns about the candidate's lifestyle" or
"unsuitable photos, videos, and information."14 4 Importantly, such
concerns can be gleaned from anywhere, including search results and
news articles. For example, in an empirical study of identical resumes
that corresponded to Internet information suggesting the applicants
were either Muslim or Christian, researchers found Muslim applicants
received significantly fewer interviews.1 4 5  This finding suggests
employers performed online searches for the applicants, learned the
applicants' religions, and then regularly chose to reject the Muslim
applicant.146
Based on this data, it is not absurd for an individual to believe
a negative search result, such as a story about a past arrest or
bankruptcy, would reduce her chances of receiving a job, loan, or
apartment. If a potential employer is already searching an applicant's
140. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 615, 84 Stat. 1114, 1133 (1970)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (2012)).
141. Id.
142. See Alessandro Acquisti & Christina M. Fong, An Experiment in Hiring
Discrimination via Online Social Networks 1, 29-30 (Mar. 12, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2031979 [https://perma.cc/BR9G-LD5F].
Empirical studies have found vastly different rates than self-reported data. For example,
Acquisti and Fong estimated that between one-tenth and one-third of employers to whom they
submitted resumes and cover letters searched applicants before interviews. See id. at 20. These
significantly different results may be attributed to employers utilizing search results at different
stages of the process, including after the interview (and therefore were not included in Acquisti
and Fong's sample).
143. CITRON, supra note 11, at 8.
144. Id. at 9.
145. Acquisti & Fong, supra note 142, at 4.
146. See id.
2017] 29
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
name, it is likely using the information to reject candidates. Once a
job seeker determines most or all of her would-be employers are
reading the negative information, the marginal cost of highlighting
the story with a flag is close to zero. Furthermore, the cost of hiring a
lawyer will further restrict the pool of litigants to those who are nearly
certain they are losing high-value opportunities.14 7  Having
established there are individuals for whom the increased emphasis
brought by the flag may not increase the odds the information is used
negatively, a second question is raised: Will the flag do anything to
change the adverse decision?
Two separate lines of scholarship suggest a flag may reduce the
impact of psychological biases and cause decision makers to reduce the
weight placed on negative information. Both lines of scholarship
suggest decision makers are acting irrationally when they reject an
applicant because of one negative link. 148 A flag may reduce these
psychologically based irrationalities. The first line of scholarship
relates to confirmation bias, in which information that supports a
person's preconceived notions is given higher value than information
that contradicts the person's initial idea.149  The second line of
scholarship concerns negativity bias, which finds that negative
information read online is given more weight than positive
information.150
One reason decision makers may place too much emphasis on a
search result is the psychological bias known as "confirmation bias."
Confirmation bias is the phenomenon in which people "assimilate new
information in a way that confirms their view of the world."15 1
Confirmation bias can manifest either by seeking out information that
confirms a person's preexisting views while avoiding information that
147. Although lawyers are not required in agency proceedings, they are common. See 5
U.S.C. § 555(b) (2012). The defendant search engines are likely to use lawyers in their defense,
so successful plaintiffs will likely use lawyers. See Russell Engler, Connecting Self-
Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed,
37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 58-59 (2010) (remarking that the success rate in administrative
appeals climbs substantially when an individual is represented by counsel).
148. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 138-39
(2008); see also Judith A. Chevalier & Dina Mayzlin, The Effect of Word of Mouth on Sales:
Online Book Reviews, 43 J. MARKETING RES. 345, 346 (2006).
149. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 148, at 139.
150. See Chevalier & Mayzlin, supra note 148, at 346.
151. SUNSTEIN, supra note 148, at 138-39.
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conflicts 152 or by interpreting and remembering gathered information
in a way that favors the person's initial beliefs.153
Confirmation bias presents a deeply troubling problem in the
area of search results because many individuals have been shown to
have incorrect preexisting beliefs about factors such as criminality and
creditworthiness. For example, studies have shown employers often
assume African American men have criminal records and are less
likely to hire these men.154 Although the data are less clear, some
studies have suggested mortgage lenders may also have preexisting
beliefs about the creditworthiness of minorities, such that they are
inclined to direct equally qualified minority applicants to subprime
rather than prime mortgages.1 5 5 Suppose an employer, who does not
pay for background checks, searches the names of applicants after he
interviews them; the employer thinks African American men are
likely to be criminals. He finds that John Smith, an African American
applicant, was arrested for robbery two years ago. The employer does
not know this robbery arrest was a case of mistaken identity and that
Smith was released without charges. Without a warning that this
information is not credible, the employer will likely find this
information very relevant and memorable, since it comports with his
world views, and not offer Smith the job.
Adding a flag reduces confirmation bias by signaling the
information is unreliable and reducing the decision maker's reliance
on it. For example, a recent study found Internet readers prefer to
read high-credibility source material, even if there is low-credibility
material available that confirms their biases.156 Another study found
that presenting readers with targeted information that contradicted
their beliefs resulted in "less 'confirmation-biased' recall" and better
152. See Julie Nelson, The Power of Stereotyping and Confirmation Bias to Overwhelm
Accurate Assessment: The Case of Economics, Gender, and Risk Aversion, 21 J. ECON.
METHODOLOGY 211, 211 (2014).
153. See Margit E. Oswald & Stefan Grosjean, Confirmation Bias, in COGNITIVE
ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGEMENT AND MEMORY 79
(Rfidiger F. Pohl ed., 2012).
154. See Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Perceived Criminality,
Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON.
451, 471 (2006). This effect is reduced if the employer institutes criminal background checks to
determine which men do and do not have criminal records. Id. at 465.
155. See Marvin M. Smith & Christy Chung Hevener, Subprime Lending over Time: The
Role of Race, 38 J. ECON. & FIN. 321, 342 (2014) (finding the effect of race to be statistically
significant); see also WALTER E. WILLIAMS, RACE & ECONOMICS: How MUCH CAN BE BLAMED ON
DISCRIMINATION? 128-31 (Hoover Inst. Press 2011).
156. See Silvia Knobloch-Westerwick, Benjamin K. Johnson & Axel Westerwick,
Confirmation Bias in Online Searches: Impacts of Selective Exposure Before an Election on
Political Attitude Strength and Shifts, 20 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 171, 181 (2015).
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remembering of opposing arguments.157 Practically, these studies
suggest that even if an employer would like to believe an article that
confirms his biases, he is less likely to base his decision on the article
if it is flagged as less credible. Furthermore, flagging is especially
useful because Internet users are already familiar with credibility
flags from online institutions, such as Wikipedia, which place warning
flags on pages of dubious quality.158"
Even if a decision maker is completely neutral when she starts
a search, research suggests she will place an irrational emphasis on
negative information compared to positive information.159  This
well-known phenomenon is called "negativity bias."16 0 For example,
Chevalier and Mayzlin found that a one-star (negative) book review in
most online book markets had a larger impact than a five-star
(positive) review.161 A similar study found negative reviews had a
greater impact than positive reviews on DVD and video sales on
Amazon.com.162 Similar results have also been found with regard to
box office sales and professional movie reviews, although only during
the first week (when moviegoers tend to rely on professional
reviews).163 Negative search results are like negative reviews-each
link provides one data point about a person's quality, and a negative
result tends to be taken more seriously than a positive one. This effect
may be exacerbated online because readers may discount the positive
information and assume it was posted by the individual to make
herself "look good," while negative information is typically not posted
for self-serving reasons.164
157. See Christina Schwind, Jiirgen Buder, Ulrike Cress & Friedrich W. Hesse,
Preference-Inconsistent Recommendations: An Effective Approach for Reducing Confirmation
Bias and Stimulating Divergent Thinking?, 58 COMPUTERS & EDUC. 787, 794 (2012).
158. See, e.g., DAN O'SULLIVAN, WIKIPEDIA: A NEW COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE? 179
(Routledge 2009).
159. See Kenneth D. Chestek, Of Reptiles and Velcro: The Brain's Negativity Bias and
Persuasion, 15 NEV. L.J. 605, 609-10 (2015).
160. Amrisha Vaish, Tobias Grossman & Amanda Woodward, Not All Emotions Are
Created Equal: The Negativity Bias in Social-Emotional Development, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 383,
383 (2008). For a discussion of negativity bias and how it develops, see id. at 395-97.
161. See Chevalier & Mayzlin, supra note 148, at 351.
162. See Nan Hu, Ling Liu & Jie Jennifer Zhang, Do Online Reviews Affect Product Sales?
The Role of Reviewer Characteristics and Temporal Effects, 9 INFO. TECH. & MGMT. 201, 209
(2008).
163. See Suman Basuroy, Subimal Chatterjee & S. Abraham Ravid, How Critical Are
Critical Reviews? The Box Office Effects of Film Critics, Star Power, and Budgets, 67 J.
MARKETING 103, 114 (2003).
164. See Zoey Chen & Nicholas H. Lurie, Temporal Contiguity and Negativity Bias in the
Impact of Online Word of Mouth, 50 J. MARKETING RES. 463, 464-65 (2013).
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The discounting of positive information demonstrates why a
flagging system presents a unique benefit to victims beyond
private-sector remedies. Businesses already exist to help companies
increase the visibility of positive information about themselves,165 and
the Internet is full of blogs advising individuals how to do the same.166
The first problem with market-based solutions is that search engines
often seek to negate their effects. For example, Google changed the
way it analyzed link structure to reduce the efficacy of "Google bombs"
that tried to increase the prominence of certain links.167 Companies
that specialize in changing link results are in a constant battle with
the search engines they seek to outwit. The second problem is that
negativity bias demonstrates it may not matter whether a link
containing negative information is listed first or fifth or fifteenth.
Because negativity bias causes readers to discount positive
information as self-serving-and therefore low value-while viewing
negative information as more credible and valuable, a decision maker
will still be unduly influenced by the negative link. A market-based
solution, even if it is effective in reordering links, may not change the
relevant decisions if would-be readers discount the positive
information and emphasize the negative information they find.168
165. See Angus Loten, Hoping to Fix Bad Reviews? Not So Fast, WALL ST. J. (Aug 6, 2012,
3:11 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444840104577548982072928526
[https://perma.cc/U83R-M829].
166. See Jeff Quipp, 50+ Sites to Help You Bury Negative Posts About You or Your
Company, SEARCH ENGINE PEOPLE (May 14, 2008), http://www.searchenginepeople.com/blog/50-
sites-to-help-you-bury-negative-posts-about-you-or-your-company.html [https://perma.cc/H92Z-
G52S].
167. See Ryan Moulton & Kendra Carattini, A Quick Word About Googlebombs, GOOGLE
WEBMASTER CENTRAL BLOG (Jan. 25, 2007), http://googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com/
2007/01/quick-word-about-googlebombs.html [http://perma.cc/R8HB-7GLS]; see also infra, notes
178-82 and accompanying text.
168. See Chestek, supra note 159, at 609-10; see also Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v.
Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 117-19 (1999). Market-based solutions also present distributional
issues to a greater degree than the flagging system. See id. Although the flagging system acts as
a costly screen to weed out frivolous claims in part because of litigation costs, there are a number
of legal aid organizations (such as law school clinics) that are a part of an existing infrastructure
for low-income individuals with promising legal claims. See, e.g., Stephen Wizner & Jane Aiken,
Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School Clinics in Enhancing Access to Justice, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 998 (2004); LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, BY THE NUMBERS: THE DATA
UNDERLYING LEGAL AID PROGRAMS (2015), https://lsc-live.app.box.com/v/LSC-2015-
ByTheNumbers [https://perma.cc/5WLL-HXQZ]. There exists no such opportunity for low-income
people in the private sector, especially since each use of a search engine optimization technique
runs the risk of Google noticing the technique and negating its efficacy. Moulton & Carattini,
supra note 167. Of course, high-income individuals may well choose to combine the flagging
system and the private market solution in the hopes of boosting the efficacy of the flagging
system, but the potential efficacy of this combination is beyond the scope of this Article.
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However, this negativity bias can be combatted by providing
outside indicia of whether the information is reliable, such as a flag.
Existing studies have found the impact of an online review depends
not only on whether it is positive or negative but also on whether the
reviewer seems to be a credible source of information. If a person has
written more reviews and the reviews are seen as high quality,
readers will give her review more weight than if she is unknown or
has a reputation for low-quality reviews.169 Similarly, whether or not
an individual review has been voted as "helpful" by a community also
alters its impact on readers.170 Both reviewer quality scores and votes
for reviews are similar to the flagging system in that they provide
small, familiar metrics for quality. As noted earlier, Wikipedia
already uses a flagging system similar to the one proposed in this
Article to indicate quality concerns.171
A flag combats negativity bias by warning readers that the
information is of reduced value, just as seeing a low reputation or
helpfulness score warns the reader of a book or movie review that the
information may be of lower value. In fact, a flag is post-specific, so it
would likely have a greater force than a generalized statement about
the quality of a reviewer. A reader may be able to justify to herself
that a bad reviewer can write a valuable review, but she is much less
likely to believe an explicitly unreliable piece of information is
valuable. Therefore, flagging is likely to combat both negativity and
confirmation biases and increase the rationality of a decision maker's
choice.
Finally, the flagging system helps correct for a frequent human
phenomenon: carelessness. Anyone with a social media account has
encountered a story that has gone "viral" (become popular), only to
realize the breaking news is in fact years out of date. In a recent
example, over half a million people viewed a five-year-old story about
a recall of Similac baby formula, which the readers believed to be an
active recall and promoted the story as news on social media.172 Users
believe they are sharing vital current information, when they have in
fact simply failed to check the date an article was published. This
169. See Hu, Liu & Zhang, supra note 162, at 202.
170. See Pei-yu Chen, Samita Dhanasobhon & Michael D. Smith, All Reviews Are Not
Created Equal: The Disaggregate Impact of Reviews and Reviewers at Amazon.Com (Aug. 3,
2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://repository.cmu.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1054&
context=heinzworks [https://perma.cc/A3XN-TLA3].
171. See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 158, at 179.
172. See Chris Quinn, What's the Lesson in the Viral, Facebook Spreading of an Outdated
Similac Recall Story, CLEVELAND (May 06, 2015, 1:23 PM),
http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/05/whats-the-lessoninthe-viral.html
[http://perma.cc/8ZQT-JPW5].
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problem is neither new nor limited to social media. In 2005, the US
Department of Defense issued an official press release decrying the
use of outdated photographs of long-closed military facilities alongside
current news articles in the mainstream media.173  Similarly,
conservative news site Breitbart was slammed in May 2015 for
reporting as current news a four-year-old allegation about Catholic
University's treatment of Muslim students, which the university had
investigated years earlier and found nothing to support.74 If everyone
from ordinary Facebook users to influential blogs and news channels
tends to forget to check the date of Internet information, decision
makers are likely to do the same. One benefit of the flagging system
is the flag prevents a would-be landlord from seeing a news story at
the top of a person's search results and assuming the story is current.
Without a flag, an employer may well assume a story about a
years-old arrest or bankruptcy is recent. With a flag, an applicant can
rest easy that this sort of mistake will not be made about her.
3. Why Flags on Search Results?
Search engine results may seem like an unexpected location for
a flag. After all, the concern is about the content of the relevant link,
so why not place the flag on the link itself? Furthermore, what about
the concern that plaintiffs may end up in a long-running game of
whack-a-mole in which they are constantly trying to bring new claims
against new links? The answer to the first is mainly a practical
matter, while the second is a matter of the architecture of search
engines. A third reason-providing an answer to logical flaws in the
current setup of Section 230 and the First Amendment-provides
further support for the proposed system.
Placing links on a search engine page solves two practical
problems: it debiases the reader at the most likely point of entry and
provides the plaintiff with a clear defendant. Depending on the
headline of a link, a decision maker may not need to read the link in
order to make a decision based on its contents. Suppose a would-be
employer searches for Sarah Smith and comes across a search result
that says "Sarah Smith, 28, indicted for embezzlement." Many
employers may well stop their search and move Sarah's application to
173. See Kathleen T. Rhem, Officials Decry Use of Outdated Images to Portray Gitmo,
U.S. DEP'T DEF.: DOD NEWS (Nov 29, 2005), http://archive.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=18200 [https://perma.ccNA3Q-MV25].
174. See Rika Christensen, Breitbart Stupidly Spreads Fear After Falling for Outdated
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the reject pile without ever opening the link. Placing a flag on the
website itself does no good if the decision maker never reaches it.
Furthermore, placing the flag on search engine results ensures
the flag will be recognized by web users. Many websites, most
prominently Wikipedia, already use flags to indicate articles may be
biased or need more work, so Internet users know to approach flagged
articles with skepticism.1 75 Most users are also familiar with the look
of their favorite search engine, but few are familiar with the pages
they find through search engines. Even if a news story was flagged on
its own webpage, newspapers have a vast array of layouts and color
schemes. Even if a decision maker was aware of the need to look for
flags, she might well miss it when confronted with a new website
style. Using a search engine as the location for the links eliminates
this problem by providing one standardized appearance for flags.
Finally, using search engines helps plaintiffs identify where to
direct their complaint. Unlike the millions of website operators,176
there are only three main search engine providers in the United
States: Google (with roughly 65 percent market share of desktop
searches), Microsoft (roughly 20 percent), and Yahoo (roughly 12
percent).17 7 This provides a parsimonious advantage to both plaintiffs
and defendants. Plaintiffs can bring claims against three defendants
for any number of links and have them adjudicated at one proceeding.
Defendants, similarly, face only one proceeding for all the links
related to a specific incident. Furthermore, search engines have the
technical knowledge to easily add a flag to the relevant search results,
while many local newspapers or freelance bloggers may be unsure how
to make their website comply with a flag order.
Additionally, this flagging system is consistent with how
Google has previously approached campaigns to alter search results,
suggesting it is well within the technical feasibility of major search
engines.1 78 When a search alteration campaign, or "Google bomb,"1 79
175. See, e.g., O'SULLIVAN, supra note 158, at 179.
176. In fact, many websites are families that provide pages to individual users and are
themselves hosted by other web companies. If a freelance blogger has his own webpage on a news
domain hosted by a large web company, who should the plaintiff bring before the FTC? The
webmaster? The writer? The network domain? The host? The answer may vary based on the
legal and technical questions concerning the design of the website, the answers to which are
completely unknown to the plaintiff. For example, is the blogger considered an independent
contractor renting space from the domain or an employee?
177. comScore Releases January 2015 Desktop Search Engine Rankings, COMSCORE (Feb.
18, 2015), http://www.comscore.com/InsightsfMarket-Rankings/comScore-Releases-January-
2015-US-Desktop-Search-Engine-Rankings [https://perma.cclZ5GM-SRJU].




has impacted search results, Google has refused to revert the search
results manually. Instead, it has linked to information about Google
bombs explaining why the irrelevant or satirical results may appear
first in the search results.180 This strategy has allowed Google to
manage both the practical difficulty of manually changing search
results (which could reduce the speed and quality of service) while also
maintaining a semblance of objectivity.181 Since Google has already
identified flagging as the most effective way of dealing with
potentially problematic search results, search engines should not have
technical problems implementing a wider flagging system.182
A further concern is whether, even suing search engines
instead of individual websites, plaintiffs will be engaged in an endless
game of whack-a-mole due to the proliferation of unflagged links with
the same content. In order to be flagged, however, content must have
misleading implications, which means it will likely be old. Although
one can spin out a hypothetical in which the content is persistently
reposted on new websites, perhaps as a part of a harassment
campaign,183 most cases of old news are unlikely to be posted anew on
many websites.
However, even if the information is added to a new website, the
architecture of search engines suggests it will not be a large problem.
A website becomes the top Google search result through Google's
"PageRank" method, which weights a page based on how many other
pages link to it.184 A link from a website that itself has been linked to
many times (think prominent websites like Wikipedia or the New
York Times) is worth more than a link from a less cited website.185
Consider it a popularity contest, in which the votes of the most
popular kids count more than the loner kids. Providing a "linkback" to
the original source of information is considered common courtesy on
179. See Panagiotis T. Metaxas & Eni Mustafaraj, Social Media and the Elections, 338
SC. 472, 472-73 (2012). Google bombs are achieved by creating webpages that link a word or
phrase to an unrelated webpage, causing Google's algorithm to believe the two are related and
rank the webpage highly. See id. A common example is a campaign to cause a search of the term
"miserable failure" to return President George W. Bush's biography. See Grimmelmann, supra
note 178, at 942 ("Thus, the most famous Googlebomb of all time is probably the one many
Democrats launched in 2003 to link to George W. Bush's official biography page with the phrase
'miserable failure."').
180. See Grimmelman, supra note 178, at 944.
181. See Marissa Mayer, Googlebombing 'Failure', GOOGLE BLOG (Sept 16, 2005),
https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/09/googlebombing-failure.html [https://perma.cc/38M4-
Q55W].
182. See Grimmelmann, supra note 178, at 943-44.
183. See, e.g., CITRON, supra note 11, at 133-34.
184. PASQUALE, supra note 9, at 64.
185. Id.
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the Internet,186 so in most cases the first link related to an incident
will either be the original report or a related story by a very popular or
reputable website, even if other websites post the information.
Essentially, each website that reposts the story is also providing a
vote for the original source, so the source website tends to stay on top
unless a very reputable website that many people link to picks up the
story.
This architecture means that a plaintiff who successfully flags
the top link or two containing the relevant information will likely not
need to renew her claim against new websites. The originally flagged
websites are likely to remain the highest ranked sources of that
information over the long-term (especially after significant time has
passed since the event). Although there may be other websites later
on in the search results that are not flagged, a decision maker who
already knows a bankruptcy or arrest is misleading will likely be able
to impute that to other websites carrying the same information.
D. Compliance with Existing Law
The final question for the flagging system is whether it violates
the First Amendment rights of search engines. The flagging system
respects the First Amendment by not removing any links, altering any
published speech, or changing the ranking of a page in the search
results.187  As discussed further below, compelling each of these
actions (removal, alteration, re-ranking) has been found to violate the
First Amendment.188 However, search engines have never asserted a
First Amendment interest in the actual content of the links. In fact,
under Section 230 of the CDA, search engines have frequently
disclaimed publisher responsibility for the content of links they
provide in search results, even when the information provided is false
or harassing.189 Although this theory of search engines' First
Amendment rights is admittedly narrow, it encompasses all of the
current case law on such rights while solving a tension inherent in the
186. See Corey Wainwright, How to Cite Sources & Not Steal People's Content on the
Internet, HUBSPOT (Sept. 21, 2017), http://blog.hubspot.com/blog/tabid/6307/bid/33098/How-Not-
to-Steal-People-s-Content-on-the-Web.aspx [https://perma.cc/54U9-QECB].
187. See Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for
Search Engine Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 883, 886 (2012).
188. See Zhang v. Baidu.Com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Langdon v.
Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630-35 (D. Del. 2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc.,
No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *1, *5 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
189. See CITRON, supra note 11, at 25.
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current setup of Section 230 by adding the proposed additional
section.190
This Section proceeds in two subparts. The first discusses the
existing protections in case law and the CDA for search engine results.
The second subpart discusses why the flagging system does not fall
within these protections.
1. Existing Protections for Search Engine Results: The First
Amendment and Section 230
Whether or not search results should be protected from
government regulation under the First Amendment has been a hot
topic of scholarly debate. Scholars such as Tim Wu,191 Oren Bracha,
and Frank Pasquale92 have argued search engine results are not
entitled to robust First Amendment protections. Wu argues search
engine results do not convey a coherent message or signify
endorsement (as Wu puts it, "no one says, 'It was interesting what
Google had to say about X'").193 Meanwhile, Bracha and Pasquale
argue search engines claim to be "passive conduits" for the purposes of
tort and copyright immunity, so they cannot be "active speakers or
discretionary editors" for the purposes of the First Amendment.194
On the other hand, James Grimmelmann,195 Eugene Volokh,196
and Donald Falk197 have suggested that search engines are entitled to
First Amendment protections. Grimmelmann argues search engine
results reflect "very human opinions" (presumably the opinions of the
writers of the algorithm that produces the results) and therefore are
entitled to First Amendment protections as speech expressing
opinions.198 In the published version of a white paper commissioned
by Google,199 Volokh and Falk argue "each search engine's editorial
190. See supra Part III.B.
191. See Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1529 (2013) ("[Als neither a
conscious curator nor a legally responsible publisher of content, a Google search is a far cry from
a newspaper.").
192. See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness,
and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1189 (2008) ("[S]earch
engines' claims for protection of their 'speech' and the courts' use of such claims as an
impenetrable shield against regulation stand on shaky ground.").
193. Wu, supra note 191, at 1528.
194. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 192, at 1192-93.
195. James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 933 (2014).
196. Volokh & Falk, supra note 187, at 884.
197. Id.
198. Grimmelmann, supra note 195, at 933.
199. See Volokh & Falk, supra note 187. The views expressed are not necessarily those of
Google, per the authors. Id. at 883, n.al.
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judgment is much like many other familiar editorial judgments," such
as the decision of which newspaper articles to run and where to place
them.200
This scholarly debate aside, existing court decisions on the
protection of search engines have fallen into two camps: those based
on the First Amendment, and those based on Section 230 of the CDA.
The First Amendment cases are divided in how they analyze search
engine results. In Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., the district
court held the ranking given to a webpage in Google search results
(also known as Google "PageRank") was an opinion on a matter of
public concern.201 A unique algorithm determines the rankings on
each search engine, so the court reasoned there was no way the
ranking assigned to a page could be factually false.202 Because the
ranking was an opinion that was not factually false, the court found
the rankings were entitled to "full constitutional protection" and could
not be the basis for a claim.203
While Search King concerned a reduction in ranking (moving a
page further down in the search results and making the link less
likely to be viewed by the searcher), Langdon v. Google204 concerned
websites the plaintiff claimed had been removed from search results
entirely. The district court in Langdon took a different approach,
instead analyzing the removal request as an issue of compelled
speech.205 The court held that, like forcing a newspaper to print
replies to editorials or forcing a newspaper to run a classified ad,
forcing Google to list a website in its results would violate its editorial
discretion.206
The final case on the applicability of the First Amendment to
search engines is Zhang v. Baidu.Com Inc., which also concerned a
search engine refusing to rank websites (this time because the
Chinese search engine was categorically blocking information about
200. Id. at 884.
201. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at
*4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 627 (D. Del. 2007).
205. Id. at 629.
206. Id. at 630-31. At least one court has been willing to differentiate between genuine
editorial judgments and decisions to remove pages for other reasons. See e-ventures Worldwide,
LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2016) ("While publishers are entitled
to discretion for editorial judgment decisions, plaintiff has alleged that Google's reason for




the "Democracy movement in China").207 The district court applied a
comprehensive approach, both endorsing the Langdon editorial
judgment approach as well as presenting a theory that the First
Amendment protects the distribution of facts as well as the voicing of
opinions.208 Furthermore, the court continued, search engines were
not like cable operators-which can be forced to carry a given number
of local television stations because they represented a potential
monopoly and were a mere conduit for other speech209-because,
logically, if they had in fact refused to rank the articles for political
reasons, they would not be acting as a mere conduit for other
speech.210  Finally, the court decided search engines could not
monopolistically silence anyone, since the pages are still available on
the Internet (albeit more difficult to find).211 Scholars have disputed
whether search engines are in fact monopolies.212 In December 2014,
Google's market share of Internet searches (excluding mobile devices)
was over 75 percent, so claims of potential monopoly do not seem as
easily dismissible as the Zhang court suggested.213
Another avenue of protection is Section 230 of the CDA, which
provides, in part, that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider."214 This provision
is commonly used by search engines and Internet service providers to
avoid liability in defamation cases in which an individual has been
defamed within or by search results (such as suggesting searching for
207. Zhang v. Baidu.Com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 434-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
208. See id. at 438.
209. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 629 (1994).
210. Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 440.
211. Id. at 441. However, this claim suffers from a potentially false premise. Search
engine results are a major source of traffic for websites, and it may be unrealistic to believe that
one page in thirty trillion can be found without the aid of a search engine. See Nathan Safran,
Organic Search Is Actually Responsible for 64% of Your Web Traffic (Thought Experiment),
CONDUCTOR: SPOTLIGHT (July 10, 2014), https://www.conductor.com/blog/2014/07/organic-search-
actually-responsible-64-web-traffic/ [https://perma.cc/35DU-CD8J] (updating Nathan Safran,
Natural Web Site Traffic Accounts for Nearly Half of All Traffic [Data], Conductor: Spotlight
(June 25, 2013), https://www.conductor.com/blog/2013/06/web-traffic-natural-search-data/
[https://perma.ccV7UR-RAKR], which found that 47 percent of website visits were through a
search engine while an additional 6 percent were from paid advertisements on search results,
with a new estimate that up to 64 percent of website traffic resulted from organic searching).
212. See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 9, at 81.
213. See Robert Hof, Why Google's Search Market Share Loss to Yahoo Means Pretty
Much Nothing, FORBES: TECH (Jan. 8, 2015, 6:02 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/2015/01/08/why-googles-search-market-share-loss-to-
yahoo-means-pretty-much-nothing/#62eal35e 11 dc [https://perma.ccIB4VH-ALA4].
214. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 138
(1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012)).
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a woman's name and an erectile dysfunction drug when her name is
searched)215 and wants the results changed or removed. However,
Section 230 has also been used to relieve search engines of liability in
cases where a person claimed invasion of privacy based on search
resultS2 1 6 or when Google refused to run an advertisement for a given
search.217 The flagging system statute proposed is literally situated
within Section 230 in order to emphasize its relationship to the case
law developed around Section 230.
From the earliest Section 230 cases, courts have recognized
"[Section] 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would
place a computer service provider in a publisher's role."218 The tension
in allowing search engines to claim a publisher's First Amendment
protections while specifically excluding them from publisher liability
is a paradox that has been previously noted in the literature.219
Bracha and Pasquale attempted to harmonize these strains by
suggesting that perhaps search engines have a First Amendment
interest in the ranking of results but not in the content of the results
themselves, although they rejected this distinction as hollow because
the act of ranking a page is not sufficiently expressive.220
Section 230 is supposed to increase the willingness of
companies to police the content they provide by exempting them from
negligence regimes (whereas if they removed some offensive content
but failed to catch all of it, they could be held responsible for the
offensive content).221 It has, however, led to search engines being
unwilling to remove results in the name of objectivity2 2 2 and to a
catch-22 for the subjects of posts. If a poster publishes invasive
information on a website, the search engines that link to the post and
the website hosting the content are immune from lawsuits under
Section 230.223 However, the poster may be unfindable or otherwise
215. See Stayart v. Google, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1056 (E.D. Wis. 2011).
216. See Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App'x 833, 838 (3d Cir. 2007).
217. See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630-31 (D. Del. 2007).
218. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Ben Ezra,
Weinstein & Co., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000) ("Congress clearly
enacted § 230 to forbid the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise
of its editorial and self-regulatory functions.").
219. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 192, at 1193.
220. See id. at 1193-94.
221. See Walter Pincus, The Internet Paradox: Libel, Slander & the First Amendment in
Cyberspace, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 279, 282 (1999).
222. See Mayer, supra note 181.
223. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (holding that the newspaper
was protected under the First Amendment); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119,
1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a website hosting third-party content not liable); Langdon v. Google,
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 631 (D. Del. 2007) (finding the search engine not liable).
42 [Vol. 20: 1:1
SEARCH ENGINE FLAGS
unable to remove the post, which leads to a situation in which victims
could get a default judgment against the poster but be unable to use
the courts to compel the search engine or host website to actually
remove the content (even though they have an injunction ordering the
poster to remove it).224 This results because requiring the search
engine or host website to enforce the injunction would be treating it as
a publisher of the information.225 Such a Kafkaesque remedy is
clearly no relief at all (not to mention widely unavailable due to the
truthfulness and public interest bars discussed earlier).226
In sum, the state.of the current protection of search engines is
scattershot. The scholarship is split on whether search engine results
are sufficiently expressive to warrant any First Amendment protection
at all. Only a few district courts have seen First Amendment cases
against search engines for failing to include pages or reducing the
ranking of a page. One found the result rankings were outright
opinions and therefore the rankings were protected speech.227 Another
view is the pages returned are not the opinion of the search engine
itself, but an exercise in editorial discretion.228 Under this view, the
practical realities of print publishing (limited page space, increased
cost, and awkwardness if more pages must be added) are similar to
search engine web "publishing" of search results, and therefore the
court cannot compel the search engine to speak differently.229 A third
view posits that search engines are entitled to protection of their
publishing and editorial choices because there is no concern that
speakers are being silenced by the search engine's decision, although
the reasoning for the search engine's decision may matter.230
Although courts seem inclined to consider search engines
publishers for the choice of which pages to display and how to rank
them, under Section 230 search engines are not liable as publishers of
the content they link to.2 3 1  Search engines are able to say to
individuals who are being harassed or extorted based on their pasts:
"We think this is the most important thing about you, and you can't
make us change our opinion or keep us from telling people, but we
224. See Connor Moran, Injunction Relief: Must Nonparty Websites Obey Court Orders to
Remove User Content?, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 47, 48 (2011).
225. See, e.g., Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 631.
226. See supra Part III.A.
227. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at
*4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
228. See Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 631.
229. Cf. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974).
230. See e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1275 (M.D.
Fla. 2016); Zhang v. Baidu.Com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
231. See, e.g., Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 630-31.
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didn't actually say it, so if it's criminal or tortious don't blame us!"
Although this situation was born from the noble goal of encouraging
websites and search engines to self-police, it has failed to live up to its
promise. Amending Section 230 to include a flagging system would
bridge this gap without violating search engines' First Amendment
rights.
2. Flagging System Avoids First Amendment Problems and Fits
Within Section 230
The flagging system does not violate any of the search engines'
First Amendment rights because it impacts neither the rank of the
page nor the decision whether or not to link to a website.
Furthermore, the flagging system takes advantage of Bracha and
Pasquale's distinction between the search engine's protected speech of
whether (and where) to place a link, and the content of the
link-which the search engine is not a speaker of, is not liable for, and
has no interest in beyond its relevance to the query.232 The flagging
system removes the "heads, I win, tails, you lose" feature of US law as
it currently stands, whereby search engines claim First Amendment
publisher rights in the order and presence of links in the name of
editorial discretion, while simultaneously disclaiming publisher
liability under Section 230.233 The flagging system vindicates the
First Amendment-protected decision of what content to display and
provides a de minimis form of liability that does not hold the search
engine accountable for tort claims that might arise from the content of
the links.23 4
The most obvious reason why the flagging system is unlikely to
violate the First Amendment is that search engines will not make
objections that make explicit the tension between claiming First
Amendment publisher rights and Section 230 publisher immunity.
They avoided this result in the past by breaking down the elements of
a search result page and claimed editorial discretion in individual
elements, such as the ranking and presence of a page.2 3 5 However, a
232. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 192, at 1193.
233. See supra Part III.D.1.
234. Note that the addition of a standardized flag on the results of certain queries is
unlikely to be overwhelmingly costly for defendants. Google has already developed a system in
response to the ECJ's right to be forgotten decision that removes certain links in response to
certain queries. See Bhatti, supra note 44.
235. See, e.g., Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 438 ("In doing so, search engines inevitably make
editorial judgments about what information (or kinds of information) to include in the results
and how and where to display that information (for example, on the first page of the search
results or later).").
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search engine might try to further push the boundaries of its First
Amendment rights and claim the flagging system is a form of
unconstitutionally compelled speech in an as-yet unclaimed area of
editorial discretion.236
There are three reasons compelled speech doctrine does not
present a problem for the flagging system. First, the flag is best
understood as a regulatory disclosure of the sort commonly approved
by courts.237 Second, it is unlikely to produce a change in editorial
policy (to the extent search engines can be said to have editorial
policies).238 Third, search engines, especially Google, have such broad
market share that they may qualify for the monopoly exception to
compelled speech doctrine as laid out in Turner Broadcasting Systems,
Inc. v. FCC.2 3 9
The sheer existence of a prohibition on compelled speech may
surprise some readers since governmentally prescribed warnings are a
common feature on foods, medicines, cigarettes, and more.240 If a
disclosure is considered "factual," it often need satisfy only rational
basis review as reasonably relating to the legislature's goal.2 4 1 The
Supreme Court has held "restrictions on nonmisleading commercial
speech" must "withstand intermediate scrutiny."242 However, this
higher level of scrutiny is unlikely to apply to flags because an agency
will already have made a finding of fact that the speech is misleading.
Whether or not search engine results are commercial speech has only
been addressed by one district court, which noted the scholarly
literature on the issue was split but felt "the search results at issue in
this case" were of sufficient public concern to qualify as
noncommercial speech.243
However, the constitutionality of such a system cannot depend
on whether or not the particular search results are about a subject of
236. Perhaps a search engine could implement its own flagging system and then say the
FTC flagging system compelled it to display flags where it would not otherwise have chosen to do
so.
237. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (allowing regulatory disclosure requirements as long as they are
"reasonably related" to preventing consumer deception).
238. But see Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974).
239. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 656 (1994).
240. For example, tobacco and alcohol warning labels have been required nationwide
since 1966 and 1988, respectively. See Sabrina S. Adler, Ian E. McLaughlin, Seth E. Mermin &
Reece W. Trevor, You Want a Warning with That? Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, Safety Warnings,
and the Constitution, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 482, 488 (2016).
241. See Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC, 315 P.3d 71, 74-75 (Cal. 2013).
242. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010).
243. See Zhang v. Baidu.Com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 442-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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public concern. Consider, for example, laws requiring the nutritional
labeling of foods, which have been upheld against compelled speech
challenges.244 Suppose a common nutrient, such as carbohydrates or
sugar, becomes a subject of public concern (perhaps because we think
people eat too much of the nutrient, or because people fail to
understand the health risk of their consumption). This new
controversy could not reasonably cause a nutrition labeling
requirement to become unconstitutional. If it did, parties who opposed
a given disclosure would simply have to generate controversy about
the general subject and could then have the disclosure revoked as it
now concerned an area of public controversy.245 Furthermore, the
specific search results at issue in flagging cases are unlikely to be
areas of public concern, because otherwise the links in question would
fail the private harms-public benefits balancing test and a flag would
never be required.
Recall the classic examples of constitutional regulatory
disclosures are those that are factual or intended to prevent deceptive
or misleading practices.246 Although a unique procedural posture, the
flagging of a link does involve a factual determination that the link is
truthful but potentially misleading.247 Thus, at the time the flag is
required, the flag discloses a fact (that the link is truthful but
misleading) found by the FTC. Not only is this a factual disclosure,
but it is also one specifically meant to prevent misleading
information-the main policy reason for allowing regulatory
disclosures.248 Therefore, the flagging system fits both the technical
and policy reasons for the regulatory disclosure exception to compelled
speech.
244. See, e.g., New York State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, No. 08-CIV-1000
(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008), aff'd, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009).
245. See, e.g., Cory Batza, Trending Now: The Role of Defamation Law in Remedying
Harm from Social Media Backlash, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 429, 467-68 (2017) (discussing the issue of
social media buzz and defining public controversy); Hannah L. Cook, #Liability: Avoiding the
Lanham Act and the Right of Publicity on Social Media, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 457, 499 (2016)
(discussing potential measurements of public controversy online).
246. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
247. Whether a representation is true or misleading are both questions of fact. See
Roberts v. Fleet Bank, 342 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2003).
248. The commercial speech element of search engine results could be, and has been, the
subject of an entirely separate paper. See Michael J. Ballanco, Searching for the First
Amendment: An Inquisitive Free Speech Approach to Search Engine Rankings, 24 GEO. MASON U.
C.R. L.J. 89 (2013). For the reasons discussed above, it seems entirely possible, if not likely, that
search engine results are best characterized as commercial speech because they are essentially




Second, the underlying policy rationale for the compelled
speech doctrine in cases like Miami Herald249 was that compelling
speech was impermissible because the "economic reality" was that a
newspaper could not infinitely print, and therefore any pages devoted
to replies would replace other content or make the publication
"unwieldy."250 The Court worried that, if faced with these doomsday
scenarios, newspapers would simply not publish controversial
editorials.251  Search engine flags will not cause these doomsday
scenarios because the flagging system works with existing search
engine architecture and will not be overwhelmingly costly.
The flagging system is deeply unlikely to change the content
provided by search engines. The link architecture of search engineS252
is premised on the idea that the most valuable links are those that
spread most quickly. In fact, when it became clear that sometimes
blatantly false articles generated enough discussion to climb to the top
of search results, Google had to invent a work-around for people who
wanted to discuss a link without increasing its prominence.253
Furthermore, unlike the newspaper in Miami Herald, search engines
are willing to publish controversial material because it generates links
and traffic.254
Google already has the ability to create a flagging system based
on its experience with Google bombs and the right to be forgotten, so
the flagging system imposes significantly fewer costs than the right of
reply.2 5 5 In fact, other websites have already implemented a flagging
system at little or no apparent cost. For example, Wikipedia has used
a flagging system for years to indicate an article appears biased,
poorly cited, or plagiarized.256
Third, the flagging system is constitutional under the monopoly
exception found in Turner,25 7 which was rejected by the Zhang court
for factually dubious reasons.258
In Turner, the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment
compelled speech defense to a statute requiring cable companies to
249. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
250. Id. at 257.
251. Id.
252. See supra Part III.C.3.
253. Google created a tag that could be used by bloggers to prevent their use of a given
link to be counted in search engine rankings of that link. PASQUALE, supra note 9, at 63-64.
254. See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 257.
255. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
256. See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 158, at 179.
257. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 653 (1994).
258. See supra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
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carry local broadcast stations.259 Here again, the Court was concerned
about economic realities-whether cable television ran the risk of
establishing a monopoly that would "endanger[] the ability of
over-the-air broadcast television stations to compete for a viewing
audience and thus for necessary operating revenues."260 The Court
noted cable was fundamentally different from the newspaper in Miami
Herald because a "daily newspaper, no matter how secure its local
monopoly, does not possess the power to obstruct readers' access to
other competing publications" while a cable company-once it
provided service to a home-provides most or all of the programming
that enters the subscriber's home.261
Search engines more closely resemble cable companies than
newspapers in important ways. As search engines become embedded
in web browsers and apps, search becomes more like cable-once a
consumer uses a product (e.g., Google Chrome), she will almost
certainly use its affiliated search function (e.g., Google) even though
she could theoretically choose to install a tool bar or go to another
page to get another search engine.262 A search engine is also more like
a cable company in that the cable company acts as a conduit for
programming-the programs shown on channels offered by a cable
company are not seen as the speech of the cable company (they are the
speech of the writers and producers, and perhaps of the station that
chose to air the program).263 Similarly, search engines are not making
substantive value judgments or conveying a message when they
provide a link to a website-they are simply connecting a user to
another website's product, just as cable companies connect consumers
with channels that offer programming.
The flagging system provides a much-needed counterweight to
the current Section 230 immunities in a world where human memory
of embarrassing incidents no longer fades. Although scholarly debate
rages on as to the First Amendment protections appropriate for search
engine results, the flagging system sidesteps those concerns. Rather
than implicating a First Amendment interest that search engines
have claimed, such as the ranking or presence of a link, the flagging
system implicates only the content of the link-for which search
259. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 657.
260. Id. at 632-33.
261. Id. at 656.
262. Deals with web browsers have become highly political for search engines. See, e.g.,
Ingrid Lunden, Mozilla Extends Its Default Google Search Blackout, Signs Up Yandex in Turkey,
TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 25, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/03/25/mozilla-extends-its-default-
google-search-blockout-signs-up-yandex-in-turkey/ [https://perma.cclS53X-VRJV].
263. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Chandler, A Right to Reach an Audience: An Approach to
Intermediary Bias on the Internet, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1126-27 (2007).
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engines have disclaimed publisher status. Additionally, the flagging
system does not implicate the same concerns as the newspaper policies
that generated the compelled speech doctrine.264 Unlike newspapers,
the practical reality is the flagging system poses little to no additional
cost, causes the removal of no content, and the avalanche of potential
requests will be mediated by the costly screen of an FTC adjudication.
Furthermore, the flagging system serves to protect consumers from
misleading information and thwart the power of a monopolistic
information distribution system-two of the policy goals that lead to
permissible compelled speech.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1989, the Supreme Court understood that "the compilation
of otherwise hard-to-obtain information alters the privacy interest
implicated by disclosure of that information" and protected that
privacy interest.2 6 5 This sentiment is more critical than ever. In an
era when bankruptcies, arrests, and poor choices can be easily
discovered with a few keystrokes, individuals need help to make sure
that potential employers, landlords, and lenders do not place an
irrational weight on one truthful but misleading report of an isolated
incident. The flagging system proposed in this Article strikes a
balance between the European solution of removing information from
easy accessibility and the US solution of leaving victims completely
without redress.
By placing a flag on links that provide small public benefit and
great private harm following an FTC adjudication, this system
corrects for confirmation and negativity biases while still allowing
decision makers to determine the exact value of information for
themselves. This moderate amendment to Section 230 would also
resolve the tension between the First Amendment publisher
protections and Section 230 publisher immunity claimed by search
engines by taking search engines at their word for what is and is not
the speech of the search engine. The flagging system protects
individuals from truthful but misleading reports from the past, and
protects decision makers from being misled, while asking search
engines to perform only minimal technical work. This system would
be best implemented through the proposed amendment to
Section 230,266 but it could also be voluntarily implemented
264. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
265. U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
764-65 (1989).
266. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
2017] 49
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
(substituting an internal or third-party adjudicator for the FTC) at
any time by a search engine.267 As the experience in Europe has
shown, courts and legislatures will eventually find ways to protect
individuals and their privacy if search engines do not act on their own.
267. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 47.
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